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1EMPLOYMENT STABILIZATION IS A NECESSARY MEiSUBS AND
SHOULD BE GENERALLY REQUIRED OP INDUSTRY.
The problem of unemployment is one of the most perplexing ones con-
fronting the American, people. Por our nation to go along as it has in the
past and let unemployment more or less take care of itself, would be a
serious "blot on the intelligence of those who are responsible for our in-
dustries. Many of the keenest minds of the country are seriously think-
ing of ways and means to stabilize the industrial working week.
Unemployment is not a new subject, although it has never been given
the serious thought that is being given to it at the present time. Unem-
ployment, in England, is at least as old as the days of Queen Elizabeth,
as is seen from the Poor Laws of 1601.* Since that time, in England, and
later in the United States, unemployment problems have presented themselves
at rather regular intervals, especially at the periods of depression of the
business cycles.
Unemployment, however, is not confined to the periods of depression.
Every year tens of thousands of workers, in this country, are out of employ-
ment from various causes.
The economic and industrial roots of the present unemployment are inter-
twined with the World War and its repercussions on every phase of life; with
the invention of productive facilities and the development of every device
of salesmanship to aid consumption of goods; with the world-wide economic
crises; and with many changes in industry which have meant an accelerated
rate of obsolescence. It must be recognized that these underlying factors
must be given consideration, for an understanding of the problem of unem-
* Joseph L. Cohen. ''Insurance Against Unemployment. 11 p. 19.

2ployment is impossible without admitting many imponderables into the
picture.
Many people are coming to the conclusion that a well paid worker is
essential to the continued prosperity of our people. This involves steady
work. Steady work involves the stabilization of the industrial working
week.
The responsibility of the problem rests largely upon the shoulders
of those who employ and also upon the government. Labor, by itself, can
not be of material aid*
The whole conception of the stabilization employment, in fact, which
comprehends planning, thinking and striving toward the bringing about of
conditions whereby people who want work may have it as long as they perform
it satisfactorily, is comparatively new. Employment stabilization is a part
of a typically American philosophy. It is characteristic of American think-
ing to regard no problem, however complex, as insoluble. Studies of unem-
ployment have led to the conviction that something can be done about unem-
ployment.* Although it may be said that the principal emphasis is laid on
the prevention of unemployment, through the better organization and plan-
ning of business or governmental action, it is generally accepted, at the
present time, in the United States, that even under favorable conditions some
unemployment is unavoidable. It is more or less obvious that no single agency
can bring about or maintain entire stability of the working week. Yet there
is no reason for inactivity. This is not a case where the chain is as strong
as it 8 weakest link, but where the rope is as strong as the sum of its strands.
3y the stabilization of the industrial working week, v;e mean the putting
into effect either by industry itself, by action on the part of the govern-
* "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on Un-
employment." p. 15.

ment or "both, methods and policies which would enable the industrial plants
of the country to be maintained upon a somewhat even and continuous pro-
duction. This stabilization would not be the perpetuation of the peak of
frenzied prosperity but a steady, average level of business which will mean
more rapid economic progress.
If we fail to provide for the continuity of business operations and for
the continued and progressive well-being of the individual units of society,
by not whittling the peaks to fill the valleys of business income, we are hold-
ing ourselves in the same position that we have during the past years. The
stabilization of the industrial working week would accomplish this continuity
and should be required of industry.

TYPES OF UMEMPLOTMEMT ARE MANY.
The cure for a disease is based largely on the knowledge of its causes.
As far as the average worker is concerned unemployment is caused by lack of
work, and he is not greatly concerned, with the various things that cause
this lack. Some of the causes, the most important, are given below,
( 1 ) CASUAL
During all times, whether good or bad, we have a number of men who will
not work, do not choose to work, find work only intermittently. Because
this type of discontinuous employment is conspicuous in longshore work,
building, mining, and other trades known for intermittent employment, it is
not generally appreciated that casual labor is used in almost all other
trades. However, in the past years, successful efforts have been made to
overcome much of this intermittent work.
( 2 ) SEASONAL
The wide extent of seasonal fluctuations has not been fully recognized
until fairly recently. Ordinarily it was thought that seasonal trades were
confined to a few industries. Now it is fairly difficult to differentiate
between seasonal and non-seasonal industries. One who examines the records of
employment rarely finds instances, where a graphic presentation is used, of a
straight line.
The causes of seasonal slumps are, for the most part, climatic; certain
commodities enjoy a natural good sale in cold weather, others in warm. Changes
in style accentuate seasonal depressions in production. The manufacturer in
a style business, not being at all certain what goods will be in vogue in the
coming season, hesitates to commit himself to a policy of piling up inventories

5in the dull season* The retailer likewise hesitates to place advance orders**
Many times the dealer's preference, for purchasing certain commodities at
one season of the year rather than another, is illogical* Nevertheless it may
be so deep rooted as to be difficult to overcome.
Manufacturers, in some lines, feel that seasonal depressions are due to a
lack of aggressiveness in the type of dealer who handles their commodities*
Some concerns avoid seasonality of production by deliberately not manu-
facturing up to the limit of their peak demand* Companies following this
practice buy the balance of their seasonal requirements from other manufac-
turers, so intensifying the seasonal peaks of these latter*
The number of industries which are seasonal because of fluctuations in
supply are far fewer than those that have annual peaks and valleys corres-
ponding to shifts in consumer demand. f These shifts are in turn largely
determined by seasonal changes in climate*
For obvious reasons, coal and ice are products which have their major
sale in winter and summer respectively. The heavy demand for candy starts
in the middle of August and reaches its peak in September and October; candy
manufacturers are also finding ways of selling more candy in the warm
seasons.
Industries have been experimenting with a number of plans for elimina-
ting or substantially reducing the extent of seasonal variations, during
recent years. Some have succeeded to the extent of guaranteeing from forty
to fifty weeks* work in a year to all employees who have satisfied a certain
service requirement. Most companies have not been so completely successful
but have made genuine progress.
What happens to these tens of thousands of workers who are out of jobs
*Edwin S. Smith. "Reducing Seasonal Unemployment." p. 54.
#Ibid. p. 39.
ttotw fcv^i /toirfw tftfaNttg 9X8 'jai fiiia Ijoo 9Bau**o* sjsoivCo to*
d i. vjau*o to'i vv*fl oji? .viftvj*a«3t*3 rceium law Ai «X*8
f i:i .... 55
1.1 c •'. 0
6with the seasonal rise and fall of employment? Some secure other work
during the slack periods* Some eke out an existence at odd jobs. Some may
have to be content to he idle. It is inconceivable that the bulk of them
want to be laid off or find enough to do to pay their way while they are
laid off*
The effects of seasonal variations in business not only appear from
marked differences in the total number of employed in manufacturing industries
in different months of recent years, but if it were readily possible to study
the employment figures for single industries and establishments, even more
marked variations would probably be found.
*
When production is viewed as a whole, variations in one industry tend
to offset, to some extent, the variations in another industry, because the peaks
and valleys come at different times and tend to counteract one another*
Often much uncertainty is produced by the difference in degree of variation
in different years, because almost every industry, even in comparatively good
times, is more active in some years than in others, and the same is true in
single establishments*
Some particular occupations, like the building trades, have very drastic
seasonal slumps, but seasonal variations in this line of work may be less
serious from the worker's point of view than in manufacture, because the rates
of pay for the highly skilled unionized labor most commonly employed in the
building trades are high enough to make a fair year's income possible in good
times, despite seasonal idleness. The unskilled workers, even in construction,
do not have this advantage*
Regular! zation of industrial employment is an important aspect of the
seasonal problem* Fortunately most of the experience data available from the
past, are the results of efforts, in Massachusetts and elsewhere, to regularize
* "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on Un-
employment.*1 p* 65*
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7industrial activity, or employment or both. Enough cases are available to
show that much can be done and there is strong presumption in favor of the
notion that success is possible* Just as seasonal unemployment tends to be
present in every industry in greater or less degree, so a correspondingly
small or large degree of off-set to this unemployment might reasonably be
expected from intelligent, aggressive and ingenious efforts for regular iza-
tion* This is not to say that every industry can eliminate seasonal variations
in activity or employment. But every industry could carefully survey its own
policies and procedures to see whether it could or should make changes in the
interest of stability.*
Industry cannot be expected to put regular iaation measures into effect
at a sacrifice, hampering itself unduly in competition. Mary concerns have
found regularization profitable*
(3) CYCLICAL
Cyclical depressions occur once in a period of years, and their occur-
rence is not yet predictable with any degree of certainty. As they are sepa-
rated by intervals during which the memory of the trials of the last crisis
becomes hazy, the high optimism and the prosperity of the new markets tend to
disperse resolves made in previous moods. Seasonal problems present themselves
frequently and are an ever-present problem. Casual employment is a daily
practice. But we are too prone to forget the last cyclical depression.
Cyclical fluctuations are not generally understood and require some know-
ledge of economic theory.
Business cycles may be called the rhythmical ups and downs of business.
The business cycle is composed of four parts: the prosperity, the liquidation,
the depression and the revival.
There are many theories of We business cycle, although it may be said
* "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on Un-
employment.** pp. 90-91.

8that there is no real theory. Among the theories are: Jevons' weather theory,
Huntington's health theory, Fisher's interest-rate theory, Hawtrey's hanking
theory, Aftalion's general-overproduction theory, Marx's inequality-of-wealth
theory, and Poster and Catching' s over-saving theory.
As an aid to determining the business cycle we have many business services
available, among which are: Harvard Review of Economic Statistics, Brookraire
Economic Service, Babson's Forecasting Service, Standard Trade and Statistics
Company, Moody's Investment Service and the Financial World.
The major unemployment times in history have occurred with the period of
depression of the business cycles. In that sense they form the greatest cause
of unemployment, at the time of a crisis. Whether or not the business cycle
can be controlled is a perplexing problem} as yet, it has not been done.
Nevertheless attempts are being made toward that end. Perhaps with the control
of the business cycle, when it comes, the problem of unemployment will not be
as serious as it now is.
Cyclical depressions occur at rather frequent intervals. In each case,
employment increased as business recovered. It is noteworthy, however, that
in every instance in manufacturing, the employees rendered jobless in the pre-
ceding depression did not all return. This would indicate that forces in
addition to business cycles have affected employment, because without other
influences the swing in each cycle would tend to reach approximately the pre-
vious peak. If the low point of a depression is coincident with the low point
of a seasonal movement, the amount of unemployment is aggravated.*
(4) TECHNOLOGICAL
Changes in business technique affect employment in some obvious ways,
but also in some that are more indirect and difficult to trace. Displacement
• "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on Un-
employment." pp. 85,6.

9of employees owing to such changes is commonly called technological unemploy-
ment. This is often discussed as if it occurred only in manufacturing, hut
it is really characteristic of almost all kinds of human activity. It ac-
companies every change in methods of manufacture, every newly adopted machine
or process, every new form of management, every important development in
methods of marketing. It is part of the price we pay for progress.
It is frequently asserted that technological displacement does not throw
many persons permanently out of work, although it is usually admitted that
such displacement causes a considerable amount of temporary unemployment.
The displaced workers are "believed to find other occupations after varying
periods of idleness, sometimes in new industries that grow up and sometimes in
older industries that are expanding. Those dismissed from factories are likely
to turn to service occupations such as attending filling stations, automobile
repair work, etc. It is worth noting that in many, if not most, instances
these unfamiliar activities are undertaken as a last resort, and not because
of inclination or training for them. The transfers often result in an exten-
sive waste of training and experience, to say nothing of the demoralizing
effect upon the individual worker. Technical changes in industry have pro-
ceeded continuously since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in England,
about 1760, They have been numerous and widely advertised since the World War,
Whether they have resulted in displacing labor at a more rapid rate than in
pre-war decades is a matter of controversy. They have, however, much reduced
the employment needs of many important industries. Unless other occupations
increase to compensate for these losses, some permanent unemployment is
bound to result.
Social progress is bought at the price of constant readjustments, which
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inevitably inflict considerable hardships on the individual concerned. The
extent of these hardships and the number of persons affected will depend on
the tempo which governs the transition, and there seems ground for thinking
that in the past few years the tempo of American transition has been exceed-
ingly rapid.* Even so, effective measures have occasionally been taken to
prevent any widespread displacement. New machines and new processes have been
introduced in such a way as to enable the working force to be progressively
reduced, not by turning off large numbers of men, but by no longer filling
the vacancies caused by death or superannuation* The adoption of pension plans
has helped to soften the effects of technological change*
The rapidity with which skilled workmen are being forced out of their
occupations is becoming more and more serious. And when a skilled mechanic is
forced out of work because a machine takes his place, it is tragic. His work
is gone, his skill is lost, his wages are usually lowered when he finds new
work, his standard of living is thus reduced, and while he is idle, his purchas-
ing power is gone* It is everybody's loss.
Particular instances of technical displacement are too numerous to men-
tion more than a few, but a few will tend to indicate the kind of situations
that they involve. In 1920, according to the best cotton mill practice at the
time, four machines were required in a picker room to separate and clean raw
cotton to be spun and woven into fabric. About 1925, improvements in picking
machinery permitted a reduction of these four machines to two, and two or three
years afterward further improvements reduced the two machines to one. The
reduction in working force required to operate the machines corresponded to the
reduction in the number of machines. §
It has been estimated that in 1830 the labor of one man was required for
an hour to make 45 bricks. Today the labor of a man for one hour will produce
* H, 3. 3utler. "Unemployment Problems in the United States." p. 89
# "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on Un-
employment." p. 70.
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40,000 bricks. Under present conditions, fewer than 90 men using the most
modern methods, and working, apparently on an eight-hour day, could have pro-
duced in a year* s working time all the "bricks which were used in the United
States in 1929. It has already "been stated that this improvement in production
methods extends to new industries from which the opportunities for new em-
ployment are expected to develop. In 1904, when the automobile industry on
a productive basis really began, the labor of one man was required for 1,291
hours to make an automobile. By 1914 this was reduced to 400 hours, and today
it is only 73 hours. To produce the 1929 output of automobiles with the
methods of 1904, the industry would have had to employ 2,940,000 men, but with
the improvements in machinery and methods that have been developed in the
twenty-five years, it actually needs only 210,000 men.*
At the present time (November, 1930) the inhabitants of the United States
use about 300,000,000 pairs of shoes per annum, or nearly three pairs for every
man, woman and child in the country. If it is true that the American shoe
factories are equipped to turn out nearly 900,000,000 pairs of shoes a year,
it seems evident that their capacity is considerably in excess of the likely,
or even possible, needs of the population. Further mechanization, which is
no doubt inevitable, can only result in a net displacement of labor. The
same is true in a great many other industries. In the woolen industry, for
example, even in the boom year of 1929 consumption only amounted to 37.5 per
cent, of the potential production in the weaving section, and to 35.8 per cent,
in the spinning section.^
When the linotype machine was introduced at the end of the last century,
the cheapening of the product led to a great expansion of printing, both of
books and newspapers, so that the growth of demand more than offset the dis-
placement caused by the machine. At the same time a shorter working week
* "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on Un-
employment." p. 70.
# H. B. Butler. "Unemployment Problems in the United States." p. 54,
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was rendered possible, regularity of employment was increased, and wages were
improved.
Mr. Gompers, then President of the American Federation of Labor, testified,
it was "one of the cases where a new machine revolutionising a whole trade was
introduced, that did not involve a wholesale disaster, even for a time."*
There is a considerable group of economists and others who hold that the
years of prosperity led to undue expansion of industrial equipment and that
insufficient purchasing power was distributed to the workers to enable them to
purchase the goods made available by the new plant. Unfortunately, it is
impossible to verify or refute this hypothesis by recorded facts. We do know
that new industrial construction and machinery production went on at a rapid
rate through the period. We do know that every industry suffers economically
from excessive capacity. On the other hand there was no evidence in the years
before the crash of the piling up of stocks of finished goods in tremendous
quantities or of prices declining under the strain of an excessive supply.
And considerable excess capacity is to be expected in a world of competition,
style change, peak loads, seasonal fluctuations and obsolescence.
#
The reorganization of industry is continually going on. Mergers and
technical improvements tend to increase output and throw men out of work. It
must be a flexible system indeed that can keep the true between production
and purchasing power, between labor demand and labor supply.
To offset the disadvantages caused by the displacement of men by machines,
a possibility may be the organization of new industries. The possibilities
in this direction may be grasped by contemplating the automobile industry, now
* H. B. Butler. "Unemployment Problems in the United States." p. 53.
# "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on Un-
employment." p. 45.
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directly or indirectly giving work to four million or more Americana who
might be unemployed if this industry had not been developed.*
We cannot apeak of "technological unemployment" as though it were some-
thing to dread, but it is technological employment which makes all better
employment possible. The automobile industry could not have happened before
it did. It could not have been developed if there had been no available man-
power, and man-power was available for its development because the discovery
of better methods had released man from the necessity of spending all his time
and energy in getting a bare living. He could now do new things; and one of
the things he did do with his newly found time and energy, was to build up this
highly desirable method of transportation. He was able to do it, of course,
only because he had good leadership. Ford led the way. He proved that men
released from the old drudgery did not have to be left unemployed but could be
employed by the millions supplying wants to which they could never have given
attention before. Every new industry has proved this. They become possible
only as better methods do put people out of work. Technological unemployment
is then not a curae but an opportunity. The curae liea in our bad thinking.
It Ilea in the fact that, with ao many demonatrationa before ua, we do not
aee our opportunity. Because, for ages, man had to spend all his time and
energies in getting a bare exi8tence, we think that when he does not have to
do so, there is nothing left for him to do. As a matter of fact, hia oppor-
tunitiea are limited only by hia wanta. The only thing that i8 lacking ia
enough organization of hia employment.!
One would be hard put to name an induatry to take the place of the auto-
mobile industry of the paat generation. However, there i8 a posaibility of
the improvement of the "health" induatriea; for example, air-conditioning.
Edward A. Pilene. "Succeaaful Living in the Machine Age." p. 62
#Ibid. p. 62
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Harold F. Clark, in "Myths of the Machine"* gives some norths and answers
to them, which relate to technological unemployment.
Myth No. 1. (THE AUTOMATIC MACHINE MAKES UNEMPLOYMENT INEVITABLE.) and
the answer, in part: Probably not more than 20 per cent, of our working
population is employed in our factories. Even if all these were replaced,
that would reduce the average working day by 20 per cent, and everybody should
have a job. We are not saying this is easy or simple or even obvious; we are
saying that sooner or later society will set up the machinery to see that this
does happen.
Myth No. 5. (UNEMPLOYMENT IS INEVITABLE. ), and the answer, in part: We
have carried over the methods of economic control from a simple economic order.
They obviously will not work at the present time. Unemployment is not inevi-
table. It cannot be abolished without setting up new instruments to control
our economic order. To bring about such changes should be an important part
of the effort of every individual.
Myth No. 6. (THERE IS NOT EMOUGH WORK FOR EVERYONE. ), and the answer,
in part: Cities need to be rebuilt. ... The world needs millions of people
to improve its health. ... In some distant age in the future problems of idle-
ness may become unavoidable* In the 20th century idleness is only an indication
of stupidity and poor organization.
Myth No. 7. (TOO MANY PEOPLE IN EACH OCCUPATION.), and the answer, in
part: Would the situation be any better if each occupation had just half as
many people in it? The country had serious unemployment when the country was
smaller and there is no reason to think that the situation would not be just
as bad if there were only half as many people today.
As the machine has been able to produce more goods, labor has never
gotten the increased proportion which as a consumer should have been its due if
* In New Outlook. February, 1933. pp. 21-24.
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consumption was to be kept in line with production.*
In other words, every time a machine displaced ten workers the wages of
the remaining workers operating that machine never came anywhere near approxi-
mating the wages paid to those who were displaced.
The well recognized tendency of industry not to hire older workers and in
numerous instances to sever employees from the pay roll, is a by-product of
technical evolution* In so far as the older workers cannot compete in pro-
ductive efficiency with the younger, there is a steady pressure on the employer
to follow this course. The movement for establishment of old-age pensions by
individual concerns, the liability of older-workers to accidents and the set-
ting up of factory health and life insurance funds contribute an added finan-
cial incentive to the employer to lower the average level of his working force.
Humanitarian forces work strongly in the opposite direction, but the more
conscientious employers must face the competition of the less scrupulous.
Profit, not the milk of human kindness, is, after all, the life blood of busi-
ness mechanism* Thus we may expect the ranks of the technologically displaced
to be increasingly swelled by idle men in their vigorous middle years «ho yet
have become "industrially old".
(5) FAILURES, BUSINESS CHANGES
AND MERGERS THROW MEN OUT OF WORK*
It is of course quite natural that when a business ceases to operate, the
men who were employed find themselves without employment. If the business is
assumed by smother, the men may be re-employed but as a usual practice, they
must secure employment elsewhere.
The movement of industries from one section of the country to another is
a source of unemployment. The migration of cotton manufacture to the Southern
* Roy Dickinson. "Wages and Wealth." p. 13
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Atlantic States and of the boot and shoe industry to the Middle West are
important causes of unemployment in Massachusetts. Movements of this kind have
not "been uncommon in the United States. They usually have been gradual, ex-
tending over a period of years. The story is a familiar one. Employers have
discovered that production costs could be lowered in some other section of the
country. Closer proximity to raw materials or to a large market for the finished
goods, or cheaper fuel, power or water supply, or lower taxes, or cheaper wage
labor, or greater freedom from trade union activities, or from legislative re-
striction, or for some other reason or combination of reasons have been given.
Hew plants tend to be built in the new lower-cost region rather than the older
section. Older plants are likely to be closed as time goes on and their busi-
ness moved to new plants in the, lower-cost area.
The driving out of older establishments by competition from the new ones
may hasten the migration. Hewer plants and newer companies attract younger
managers less wedded to the old routine and more alert to newer methods of
production and marketing and of shifts in consumer demand. Better management
is easier in up-to-date plants with new equipment. Increase in business and
employment develop in the newer area. Decrease in business and declining
employment are the fate of the older section.
Migration in the boot and shoe industry in Massachusetts, which as in the
case of cotton manufacture, has been in process a long time, and has accompanied
the introduction of better marketing in the Middle West and an increase in
foreign competition.
*
The unemployment caused by industrial movements of this kind is particu-
larly difficult to solve, for prevention means preventing the industrial migra-
tion itself. It is probable that only a counter process of industrial readap-
* "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on Un-
employment." p. 80.

tation in the older section will succeed if there is any lesson to be
learned from similar experience in other countries faced in the past with
the necessity of similar competitive readjustments to meet conditions in
newer countries. Cotton and shoes face, in Massachusetts, a problem not
essentially different from that confronting the English steel, coal and
shipping industries, or the American wheat farmer, since the World War,
having encountered competition of lower-cost producers in other sections
of the world, including other sections of the United States, coupled with
an increase in production in competing areas.* This has brought about a
total productive capacity in the industry as a whole far beyond the limits
of any demand reasonably to be expected, and a decline in the industry in
the older longer established centers.
The degree to which Massachusetts 1 cotton and shoe manufacture will
come back is dependent on developments within these two industries. Much
old plant and equipment already have been scrapped and heavy capital loss
incurred. Special effort and high technical skill may bring back portions
of one or both of these migrating industries. The advantages enjoyed by
other sections, mainly not endowments of nature, may not be permanent.
Low wages of labor may not last. The geographical advantages are partly
a matter of transportation rates. New technique is a man-made product. It
seems probable that newer branches of these industries and wholly different
industries will replace what has gone. This is the story of industrial
migration elsewhere. The process will be slow, whatever it is, and unem-
ployment must be dealt with in the meant ime.#
* "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on
Uneraployment
.
H p . 8 1
.
# Ibid. p. 82.
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A movement which has attracted attention is the growing practice of in-
dependent concerns to merge under a single management. The vertical merger,
which aims at control over all stages in the manufacture of a commodity from
raw materials to finished product, is not of itself likely to bring about any
appreciable reduction in the amount of labor required; but the horizontal merger,
which results from the combination of plants manufacturing substantially the same
product, gives rise to a different situation. It may be that the central con-
trol will confine itself to broad questions of finance and leave to individual
plant managements a substantial autonomy which does not differ greatly from their
former independent operations* Or the merger may affect a closer control of the
market, and secure a larger proportion of the total available business, which
will tend to make each plant more active than formerly, A reassignment between
plants of commodities for manufacture or operations to be performed, for the
purpose of securing more efficient use of the combined facilities, may c ause no
diminution in the activity of individual divisions of the merger. Consolida-
tions resulting in these conditions do not materially affect employment con-
ditions.
But in practice other situations have frequently developed. Increased
efficiency has made unnecessary the operation of all plants, or one or more
plants have been cut down to a mere skeleton of the former size. The purpose
of an absorption of a company may have been primarily to secure control of
patents and, this accomplished, the plant may be of no further value to the
central management. Whether such plants are closed or continued on a reduced
scale of operation, superfluous employees must be released, some of whom have
long service records to their credit. Here management faces a serious problem
and must proceed slowly, for the decision in the first such instance is likely
to be regarded as a precedent to be followed in other similar situations which
may develop later.
*
* MLay Off and Its Prevention." p. 8.
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(B)
THE UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM IS FAR REACHING IN ITS IMPORTANCE
It is an extremely difficult thing to find the actual extent of unem-
ployment in the United States* The figures for the present time are variously
estimated. Even if one knew the exact amount, the question of the interpre-
tation of the figures would require an enormous amount of work*
Unemployment affects all strata of our economic life. This is especially
true if the extent of unemployment is as marked as exists at the present time,
but under any condition those out of work create a problem which is not easily
solved.
(1) THE NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED
UNEMPLOYED WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 1920-1932.
1920 - 1,400,000
1921 m am - 4,200,000
1922 3,400,000
1923 1,500,000
1924 - 2,300,000
1925 — — 1,700,000
1926 1,600,000
1927 2,000,000
1928 1,800,000
1929 1,600,000
1930 2,500,000
1931 - 6,000,000
1932 - 11,500,000
The above figures (approximate) are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
except the one for 1932, which is the estimate of William Green, president of
the American Federation of Labor.
As far as the estimate of the present time, (March, 1933, } is concerned,
it is variously given up to 15,000,000,* with no definite accurate total
available.
* Business Y/eek of Jan. 18, 1933. pp. 19-20.

(2) THE SOCIAL PROBLEM.
The social point of view on unemployment starts with the premise that
year-round employment is best for the worker's well-being and satisfaction* A
steady employed worker develops habits of industry which a worker employed
part time, even at an equivalent annual wage, is unlikely to attain. The steady
worker becomes a more efficient worker and, in the long run, can earn more
because he can produce more. The worker with a regular income is a saver of
money and an intelligent spender. The man who is called in at high wages to
do a six months' job may regard his compensation, in effect, as an annual wage
and budget his expenditures accordingly. It is more likely that the receipt
results in
of relatively large sums of money at certain times of the year relatively
large expenditures while work lasts, succeeded by pinching, borrowing and
perhaps charitable aid during the weeks and months of enforced idleness. As
the authors of "Can Business Prevent Unemployment?" have well stated: "The
overhead of labor consists in the fact that wage earners' families live by
the year though they work by the day."
Under the ancient formula, business had no social responsibility. In
times of prosperity employers employed, and when hard times came they ceased
to give employment. The idea that it was the responsibility of business to
create good times did not occur, either to the traditional business man or to
his traditional critic. The business man, however, was rising to power, and
he liked that. Power without responsibility seemed to be his aim; and it be-
came the dread word. That business, particularly big business, should have its
own way, caused millions to shudder,
Now it is time for all of us to change our minds* Hot because business
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men have "become good, but it has been discovered that business can succeed only
as it creates success for everybody. The greatest total profits can now only
come from the greatest total service. There must not be jobs for everyone but
actual wealth-producing jobs - jobs that shall not merely distribute the ever-
increasing volume of wealth which better machinery and better methods constantly
make possible.
If business can organize to do this, the old bugaboos must vanish, tto one
need worry then about the greater and greater power which it may attain. "More
power to business" will be the universal plea: but not more power to business
men who have not yet learned what business actually is.
Unemployment has well been termed the shadow-side of progress. It is es-
sentially a by-product and characteristic of this, the latest stage, the capi-
talistic stage, of production.
In the report of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on Unemployment
we find that most wage earners in Massachusetts with families cannot save. The
saving that is done by workers in Massachusetts manufactures must then be done
by unmarried workers, or married workers without children or who have some
other means of income.* What is true in Massachusetts is in all probability
true in the other states of the country. If a person cannot save with the in-
come which he gets, the problem of support is a serious one, as soon as he is
out of work for any length of time.
The inability of workers to plan properly may force resort to the pawn-
shop or to loan associations, involving charges that further reduce the income.
Or it may necessitate purchases on credit, with the usual mark-ups in price.
By such charges and others, the worker in an irregular trade finds himself much
more troubled by his irregular income than the steady worker with lower average
earnings. The time may come when the period of unemployment is much longer
than expected and the usual resources do not avail. Then he may be forced
* "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on Un-
employment." p. 106.
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to seek the aid of charity.
Thus there comes the significant result, noted La many social investiga-
tions, that irregularity of income is a much more important source of pauperism
than low wages, and that mere irregularity of income leads to pauperism and
dependence on charity when the same or lower income distributed evenly would
prohab]y not.*
Unemployment is often called a disease of society. I am inclined to think
that one is nearer the truth if one speaks of it as a symptom. Unemployment is
like a head ache or a high temperature - unpleasant and exhausting but not
carrying in itself any explanation of its cause. A high temperature might be
got by catching malaria or by breaking one's leg or by eating too much; it may
mean that one has something wrong with one's appendix or lungs or teeth, that
one is in the thick of a bad cold. Until one finds out which of these and
many other possible causes is at work, one will not have gone far in finding
a cure simply by knowing how many degrees of fever one has. The clinical
thermometer is an indispensible but limited instrument.
The idleness of men who wish to work is the most dangerous surplus which
can exist in any country. Its paralyzing blight reaches not into our economic
structure alone, but goes much further.
It is ridiculous to speak of unemployment as a necessary condition of
human society. It is nothing more than a maladjustment of its machinery. It
is blot on our intelligence. It is^drain on our sympathy. It is a promoter
of charity, which affects disadvantageously both those who give and those who
receive.
Some day we shall learn to do better; 3UT II MUST InLou* IT SOGtf.f
Mr. Louis D. Jsrandeis, justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
at one time justly termed unemployment the ''worst and most extended of the
industrial evils of today".
I. Feldman. "The Repolarization of Employment . " p. 24.
t Charles w. Baker. "Pathways Back to Prosperity." p. 1.

Irregular employment undermines the physique, deadens the mind, weakens
the ambition, destroys the capacity for continuous, sustained endeavor, induces
a likeness for idleness and self indulgence, saps self-respect and the sense
of responsibility, impairs technical skill, weakens nerve and will power,
creates a tendence to blame others for failures, saps courage, prevents thrift
and hope for family advancement, destroys a workman's feeling that he is taking
good care of his family, sends him to work worried and unfed, plunges him in
debt.
Frequent irregularity of employment, frequent discharge and the frequent
necessity of hunting new jobs - the lot of any number of American citizens -
who
are bound to leave their marks on the worker. How many young^ start out in
life with hope and courage and capacity find themselves, through no fault of
their own, out of work; lose their old connections; become discouraged and
finally join the ranks of the beggars or criminals of our cities!
Unemployment is a risk which is borne not only by the individual worker
but by society as a whole. The presence of large armies of unemployed in our
midst cannot be said to affect one group only. An unemployed person inevitably
is one who may become a danger and a menace to many persons who are even unaware
of his existence. If he is unable to attain work within a reasonable time his
morale begins to weaken, to say nothing of the effect on his well-being.
Multiply this one man by 10 to 15 million in the United States and you have a
horde of unemployed men and women who lack purchasing power, thus producing
an immediate reaction upon business and industry, upon manufacturers and mer-
chants. Although out of work and unable to buy the necessities of life, still
these men and women need food and clothing and often shelter. This at once
places a burden upon the public, and taken together with the inevitable de-
pression in trade, reduces prosperity and the welfare of society as a whole.
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Unemployment is never less than a tragedy to the individual. The fact
that social progress may involve unemployment of individuals is the justifi-
cations of social measures for dealing with and relieving unemployment. But
the measure must be such as to ease, not hinder, progress,*
Nothing is more demoralizing for wage earners than the feeling of in-
security of employment. Unemployment and the fear of unemployment are power-
ful causes of discontent. Wage-earning men and women must meet responsibili-
ties for the support of themselves and their families wholly from their earn-
ings. Loss of employment not only eliminates income but lessens the ability
of wage-earning men and women and their families to make purchases, thus
intensifying the period of depression.
The slogan is commonly repeated in the United States that "the best cure
of unemployment is employment". This is a truism which can not of course be
over-emphasized, and the main endeavor of American social thinking has been
along the positive line of regularizing employment as the most effective
antidote to unemployment.
Under private ownership, however, there is tendency for each industrial
organization to gain the greatest immediate advantage for itself. Stock-
holders are constantly demanding of the boards of directors maximum immediate
profits. Boards of directors are bringing constant pressure to bear upon
management for maximum financial returns; and the price, wage, production and
investment policy of the corporation is determined not with a view of social
welfare, but with the primary object of securing the largest net income for
the individual corporation.
We can let the law of supply and demand fix the price of all other com-
modities, but we can no longer let it fix the price of labor. To do this
* Sir V/illiara H. Beveridge. "Causes and Cures of Unemployment." p. 10,

would quickly force down all wages to the point of "bare subsistence for those
who could find employment, and leave nothing whatever for all the rest**
Still "broader and more complex issues are met when questions of the
social value of the additional leisure are raised. It is recognized that in-
creased leisure has come to have a definite economic value under the present
organization of industry, in that it permits for some industries a better
balancing of production and consumption. Commodities tend to be over-produced
and to lose part of their market value if consumers, though able to buy them,
do not have the time to use them. But many persons question whether the
extension of leisure is justifiable merely on such grounds, and ask whether
additional leisure will be used in ways beneficial to the cultural interests
of society,
* Charles W, Baker. "Pathways Back to Prosperity." p. 273.

(c)
THE EMPLOYEES SHOULD ASSUJffi PART OF THE RESPONSIBILITY.
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( 1 ) aaSKPLOBKT IS Y/ASTEFUL FROM. THE BUSINESS
STANDPOINT.
(a) LABOR TURNOVER IS COSTLY
When it is necessary, for one reason or another, to change or to hire
new workers, a whole chain of costs is set in motion. The machinery of hir-
ing workers in some plants represents a sizeable amount of money. This in-
cludes, in some instances, physical examinations, correspondence concerning
references, clerical costs, rent, etc. These new workers require special
instruction and in some cases require special training. Estimates as to the
cost of labor turnover range anywhere from $50 upward. Such estimates do not
figure^in all cases, the damage caused "by errors while learning a new job. A
new worker is said to cause more accidents and to be a victim of more accidents
than a regular employee.*
(b) IMPAIRMENT OF SKILL AND EFFICIENCY.
Even though a worker may have the best intentions, discontinuity of work
impairs his skill. Numbness of fingers and the conditions of the muscles play
a part in the efficiency of most workers, and only when they work with regu-
larity at their occupation can they give their best performance.
In plants where scientific standards of production and accurate records
are available, the effect of idleness upon the worker's efficiency when he
resumes work can be measured definitely. In one plant it was found that the
absence of weeks from a job on which the worker had been employed for a long
time impaired speed so much that special wage adjustments were made in
* H. Feldman. "The Regular izat ion of Employment." p. 35.
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certain cases to keep workers from becoming discouraged at the beginning.*
Prom the point of view of the employer, the efficiency of the labor
force, as a whole, is impaired because the more efficient are likely to se-
cure employment elsewhere and when work is resumed the less efficient or
the mediocre comprise the labor force.
(c) INCREASES OVERHEAD.
Overhead costs keep going along even though the plant may be shut down
because of lack of work. Every fair-sized firm demands certain outlays for
land, buildings, equipment, etc. in fact, fixed assets. When the plant is
idle the investment is not being put to productive use and a loss results,
let us say, equivalent to the loss of interest which the money would bring.
Capital is likewise idle. There are certain fixed running expenses such
as taxes or rent, insurance etc. Wages may be avoided to a large degree but
most of the salaries continue although they may be cut somewhat.
(d) CURTAILED BUYING POWER CAUSES MORE UNELtPLGYMENT
Unemployment with its decrease of income does not permit the worker to
spend with the frequency that he formerly did. His expenditures must of
necessity be made for the necessities of life* Naturally fewer goods are
bought, fewer goods are produced, which causes further curtailment of employ-
ment, and so the vicious cycle continues.
(2) IT IS PITTING THAT BUSINESS MEN SHOULD TACKLE THIS PiiOBLEM
Industry itself should be urged to use every effort to stabilize its
employment policies. In a number of industries, through better planning, sea-
sonal unemployment can be considerably lessened. Displacement due to tech-
* H. Peldman. "The Regular ization of Employment." p. 33.

nological changes should he rendered less painful, if such improvements were
adopted gradually, if older workers were retained and if a dismissal wage
were paid to those dropped because of technological or administrative changes
uhile good management can reduce, it cannot cure, seasonal unemployment
and that even if industry were to set itself the task with far more energy
than it has shown in the past, a considerable amount of seasonal unemploy-
ment would in all likelihood exist.
Mr. Sam a. Lewisohn, president of the American Uanagement Association,
holds that as the direction of affairs of the business world lies mainly in
the hands of employing management and of financiers, it is obvious that the
responsibility for taking the initiative in adopting measures to minimize
unemployment is primarily theirs. Thi3 does not mean that unemployment is
the fault of these groups or that they are responsible for bringing about
the conditions antecedent to unemployment. But what is suggested is that
these groups are the only ones that can be of any large influence in mitigat-
ing these conditions.
•
"Steady Employment" can be made more of a problem to the individual
employer. It is true, of course, that the ebb and flow of immigration, fluc-
tuations in the tariff, general trade booms and depressions, and such world
cataclysms as the .resent war bring about unemployment. But my theory is
that the problem of unemployment is the problem of good times rather than of
bad times and that say dO/o of all the unemployment which men and women suffer
and which demoralizes and degrades them can be eliminated by proper organiza-
tion within the factory walls.**
A good many of the employers work on the theory that periods of employ-
ment and unemployment are wished on us or come largely as "Acts of God". So
H. Peldman. "The Regular izat ion of Employment. p. 68.
M Paul F. Gemmill. "Present Day Labor Relations." p. 249.
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the stroke of lightning may be taken as evidence of Divine dispensation. But
this does not prevent us from erecting lightning rods to guide this power
back: to Mother Earth in such a way that no harm is done. In the same spirit
scientific management takes the hopeful attitude as to these interruptions
in employment. Vt say that unemployment is something that should be elim-
inated from our industrial system. *
The view that employers must be held responsible to a considerable degree
for the regularization of employment in their individual plants has become
more current. Spread of the principles of scientific management has impressed
business executives with the costs in idle plant and labor force and, together
with humanitarian considerations, has stimulated them to conscious effort for
continuity of production and employment. But it is evident that the indivi-
dual management has much less control over the factors of cyclical unemploy-
ment than those of seasonal slackness,
* Paul F. Gemmill, "Present Day Labor Relations." p. 249.
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(3) THE EMPLOYEES SHOULD HOT SB HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR
THE 3U:<DEN OP UNEMPLOYMENT
(a) THEY CAN NOT CONTROL THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT.
The control of the conditions of employment at the present time is large-
ly in the hands of the employers. Over a period of years the employees, large-
ly through the aid of labor unions, have made an impression; yet after all is
said and done the employers still have the almost undisputed control.
Employees either as a group or as individuals have made attempts to con-
trol production and thus indirectly have tried to stabilize employment.
In a tire plant, a foreman* s clerk asked the men why they were working
so slowly. Several answered, "If we do any more, they will cut the rate."
The clerk wondered whether these men were right, or whether they were just lazy
and did not want to work more rapidly. He found out soon after, when a new
foreman took charge of this department. One of the foreman's first official
acts was to check up on earnings. He found a woman earning ^6 a day, and a
man and wife earning ^8 and ^6 respectively. He remarked that (v& was "too
much for any woman to he earning," and that $14 was excessive for a family.
Arbitrarily, he cut rates so that the woman could earn only ^4 a day.#
Three workers in a New York auto -accessory plant had become quite expert
in testing assembled ball-bearings for defects. The testing was done by
turning the finished bearings at high speed. The defects were detected largely
by the trained ears of the testers catching the variations in sound made by
* H. Feldman. "The Regularization of Employment." p. 354, 5.
# Stanley B. Mathewson. "Restriction of Output Among Unorganized Workers, p. 56.
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the bearings as they rotated. The testing was so noisy that booths had been
built around the testing devices to shut the racket away from the rest of the
shop. There was glass in the partitions but only the heads of the testers could
be seen from the outside. Moreover, the booth doors could be hooked from the
inside, so that anyone entering the booths had to knock on the doors and thus
give warning of his approach.
A large order for bearings was cancelled. The information soon reached
the testing group. One tester told another* "Take it easy now. If we don't
slow up, we will all be out of a job soon. 3e sure to keep some work ahead
all the time so that when the big boss comes around he will see that we have
work to do." After this the testers worked only about half time and read and
visited the rest of the time behind the hooked doors.
The foreman was anxious to keep his three expert testers, and would
always pass the word to them when the works manager was approaching. He told
them to "look busy whenever the big boss is around." The men managed to do
this, and as one of the testers said, "By holding back we were able to avoid
the lay-off." All three were on day rates, and they lost no pay.*
To assume that all restriction is the result of conditions external to the
worker would be erroneous. Grievances, dislikes, hard feelings against manage-
ment, and discouragement often interfere with fullest production. The worker
feels, of course, that he is fully justified in his aversions and antipathies.
Nevertheless, his grievances, whether imagined or real, have their effect upon
the amount of work he will turn out. Ill feelings between individual workers
over small matters will often interfere with fullest production.
In a machine manufacturing plant there were two groups of workers, en-
gaged in continuous process work, who reported to separate superiors. The
* Stanley B. Mathewson. "Restriction of Output among Unorganized Workers."
pp. 89-90.
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larger group of about twenty-five men was engaged in processing, repairing
and painting certain parts. These parts moved along a conveyor to a point
where they were given a final test "by the two men who reported to the en-
gineering department. The two testers were on straight time while the others
were on group bonus. The bonus was paid on the number of finished parts that
passed the inspectors. It was, therefore, to the advantage of the group on
the conveyor to keep their production up to a certain limit. The situation
is brought out by a conversation between Mac, a conveyor worker, and one of
the test men.
"Did we make bonus last week?" Mac asked one of the testers. "We had
such a slow day Friday I wonder if we made out."
"I don't know," the tester replied, but you fellows would get more pro-
duction if you quit crowding."
"What do you mean 'crowding'?" Mac demanded.
"Oh, hell," the tester exploded. "That big Turk (indicating one of Mac's
fellow-workers) keeps snatching the parts off the side conveyors and crowding
down on us and yelling at us. I hold him up every time he does it, and so
does the other tester. We don't get any more pay whether we test ten or a
thousand. We are not on bonus and I am not going to work myself to death.
Besides, we work for the engineering department and can even tell your foreman
where to head in. That big Turk hasn't anything to do with us and every time
he tries to crowd us, we hold him up. It's nothing to us.'"*
The human nature of the workers, therefore, tends to protect even those
short-sighted employers from their own short-sightedness; for if the workers
would work for next to nothing, they would certainly be able to buy next to
nothing; and their employers being able to sell next to nothing, would very
* Stanley B. Mathewson. "Restriction of Output among Unorganized workers."
pp. 103-104.

soon cease to be employers.
Restriction of output is a serious matter, regardless of the means by
which it is accomplished. In the abstract, it is clear that there should be
no interference with the productive processes; but, confronted with a concrete
situation, the proper course of action may not be so plain. Those who practice
restriction, if they bother to explain their action, never fail to describe it
as a defensive measure.*
(b) THE/ CAIi tfOT ATTAH* SECURITY THROUGH THEIR OWIJ EFFORTS
Ho matter how well a worker may perform his duties it is no guarantee
that his work will be stable. If there is little work, not all the skillful
would be retained. It is the practice in many establishments when it is time
to let workers go to let those who have the longest tenure to remain the long-
est regardless of skill.
The problem is complicated further by the tendency in modern business
to discard middle-aged workers on the grounds that they can not be speeded up
in the same way that can workers in the twenties and early thirties. Regard-
less of the effort which these middle-aged workers put forth, their outlook,
in many establishments, is rather cloudy.
* Paul F. Gemmill. "Present Day Relations." p. 43.
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stabilization of the industrial working week inl&y 3e achieved
bx 1.iany meaus adaptable to the individual industries.
Pew subjects in recent years have attracted more attention from "busi-
ness men than the stabilization of business operations. Various devices
have been applied with varying degrees of success. Many of these have been
ineffective because of failure to base the plans upon the fundamental fact
that business policies should be determined with full recognition of their
relation to the business cycle and other causes of unemployment.
To attack any problem effectively, it is essential to locate the point
of control, and the employer controls hiring, lay-off and dismissal of
workers. He does not control the long-term swings of business, but he
can determine to an appreciable degree the amount of unemployment which even
long-terra factors produce among his own workers.
The reasoning which placed the cost of workmen's compensation upon the
employer applies in part to unemployment also. In either case he bears only
part of the cost. The employee is not fully compensated and really bears the
rest.
Irregularity of employment, with what it implies, has been found to be
unsatisfactory from the standpoint of management, as well as a hardship to the
employees, who can not rely upon a regular income. The fact that the interests
of both will be served by greater stability of operation and employment is the
best assurance that this problem will continue to receive serious study.
"Interest in the technique of employment regularization seems rooted
in the progress of scientific management and in humanitarian considerations
arising out of the depression of 1914-1915. Impressed by the prevailing
unemployment, a small group of forward-looking men turned their attention
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towards making employment more secure. The flush employment of the war
years afforded an opportunity, and mounting wages, a stimulus. The
depression of 1920-1922 gave further impetus to such plans and there is
now evidence of a new sense of employer responsibility, "•
Scientific management has been and still is of enormous importance in
the organization of industry; hut like every other good thing can be over-
done and abused.
"The spread of the principles of scientific management during the war
when costs were mounting rapidly had a part in prompting employers to
regularize production, thereby making employment more regular for employees.
Management began to assume the aspects of a profession. It became a subject
to be studied by young people in universities, and by business managers through
conferences and extension courses. Specialization in the field, and, with
advancing wage rates, greater recognition of the importance of the labor
factor in production gave rise to the profession of personnel management
which has as one of its aims the best utilization of the working force. In
the effort to reduce management to principles and techniques and so eliminate
all forms of waste, unemployment seemed an anomaly. Finally, it v/as asserted
that as most business works under competitive conditions and its dominating
motive is profits, only the most scientific of managements would be able to
reduce fluctuations in employment to a minimum.
This conception that employers should be held responsible for regular-
izing their own employment was a basic principle of the Huber bill on unem-
ployment insurance advocated by John B. Commons in Wisconsin and of similar
methods proposed in a few other states. "#
* "Unemployment Benefits in the United States." p. 64.
# Ibid. p. 62.

Our economic system is characterized by freedom of individual enter-
prise whereby anyone may enter any lawful occupation, with some few excep-
tions, to which he inclines or into which he is thrust "by circumstances.
He may go to work for anyone who will hire him. He may set himself up in
any business for which he can get capital. All of which means that many
persons enter occupations for which they are unfitted.
This freedom admits into business as employers not only those likely
to succeed, but also those bound to fail. It admits the racketeering
type of employer, who hires under such terms that workers are driven from
his employment. It admits not only careful lr.bor managers, but those who
look upon all methods to regularise employment as nonsense, and who con-
tinue to hire and fire at will, adding annually to the number of workers
moving from job to job or into joblessness. Nevertheless this type admits
to great successes.
A solution, of course, would be for business leaders of America to
get together and publicly accept the responsibility for unemployment, pledg-
ing themselves that hereafter, whatever else happens, they will guarantee
to organize employment for all who are willing to work.
(1) BBGUJ4S50I OF PiiODUOi'IOj*.
(a) gqf&miX DLJSai^UTJSD THROUGHOUT THE TadSL.
Some of the essentials for the stabilization of production are: Know-
ledge by chief executives of the principles of economics and of the underlying
principles governing business fluctuations. Accumulation of facts and presenta-
tion of data thoroughly analyzed to guide business policies and permit planning
and budgeting. Conservation of assets in prosperity, avoiding undue increase
. c _
]
in plant and equipment and dividends. Avoidance of excess of inventories
of raw materials, materials in process and finished stock. Avoidance in
excessive sales that result in cancellations. Service to customers. 41
Stabilized production would do much to improve prices and profits and
to eliminate destructive forms of competition. It is a key to greater pros-
perity and the market is the direct approach through which research advertis-
ing, and educational promotional effort would complete the answer.
There h»ve been many companies that have attempted and have been suc-
cessful at the distribution of work throughout the year.
Many shoe manufacturers have commented on the leveling effect of hand-
to-mouth buying on production. The Commonwealth Shoe and Leather Company
of Boston, say 8 that, before hand-to-mouth buying became customary, each
year in February and March, and also in August and September, shoe orders
for the coming se*son piled in so fast that they were unable to care for
them adeouately. This resulted in high-cost manufacture and lower quality in
the finished goods. H«nd-to-mouth buying has helped to level out these
manufacturing humps. Maintenance of in-stock department has built up busi-
ness in April, May* October and November, with the result that this company
states that its factories have practically steady employment throughout the
year.#
Diversifying the product.
The Policyholders* Service Bureau of the Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company in 1925 studied the efforts of stabilization in the California
Packing Corporation. This concern used to operate its canneries about
* "Business Cycles and Unemployment." pp. 135, 6.
# Edwin S. Smith. "Reducing Seasonal Unemployment." p. 44.

six months of the year. At the time of investigation the season had been
extended in m«ny of its plants to 9 months and in some to year-round opera-
tion. The picking of spinach in the spring and tomatoes in the fall was
a big step toward stabilization. To supply a ready supply, the farmers
were encouraged to plant these crops, the company contracting for two-
thirds of the output before the seed was planted.*
The Beech-Nut Packing Company, of Canajoharie, New York, developed
the sale of tomato products in the fall to compensate for its summer-time
demand for chewing gum and confections and also peanut butter to the lint
to balance more seasonal conserves.*
Creating out of season uses.
The General Foods Corporation, the largest merger in the package foods
business, at first advertised Jello as a dessert product. To increase
summer sales it has advocated its use in the making of molded salads, etc.#
The Hills Brothers' Company, who produce the "Dromedary" brand of
dates, has been successful in leveling out the production during the year*
In 1921, owing to the methods then in vogue, the huge volume of business
did not bring regular employment to the workers. The curve of production,
that is packing, shows a sh«rp pe*k. By the deep wide hollow which precedes
the pe»k one can see the extreme range of fluctuation of employment. It
meant hundreds of persons laid off and left without incomes, an impaired
morale in the plant, and many industrial wastes.
As the result of the policy inaugurated in March, 1922, the company
manufactures practically an even amount each month, basing the production
schedule on the anticipated sales of the whole year. The production curve
will, therefore, be either steady or changing gradually, and the peaks
* Sdwin S. Smith. "Seducing Seasonal Unemployment." p. 99.
# Ibid. p. 77.
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and hollows in employment will be practically eliminated. This was largely
brought about by finding out the best temperature at which dates kept and
keeping them at that temperature.
*
(b) STANDARDIZATION OF PRODUCT, STYLES, ETC.
Anything, that may aid in the process of regularizing production in the
first instance regularizes employment, bolsters up consumers* purchasing
power, and in turn provides the market necessary to keep production capac-
ities going. To the extent that standardization may provide information
leading to the control of business fluctuations or a technique of manufac-
turing to stock, it is an indispensable aid in regularizing employment.
Standardization cheapens productive processes, increases the per
capita output and the per capita purchasing power and offers an equal op-
portunity to all to get a share in the increased business.^
Standardization affords a basis upon which commodity price competition
is possible, and a basis upon which to make a definite, intelligible and
sustained appeal for trade.
#
Standardization makes possible purchase upon specification rather than
upon brand or trade name, thus cutting the cost of the individual producer
by avoiding the extra payments upon hypothecated "good will" born of suc-
cessful or anticipated trade-mark or brand monopoly.
Reducing the items in a line to those which enjoy the quickest turn-
over, the most certain sale, is a fundamental step in a program of regulari-
zation. When siraplication has been achieved manufacturing in advance of
orders may be undertaken with less risk. Also the fact that the line is
* H. Feldman. "The Regularize tion of Employment." pp. 54-57.
# "Industrial Standardisation." p. 206.
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freed of dubious items and represents only merchandise of tested sales
value makes it easier to persuade the retailer to place orders early.
Simplifying the line is a continuous process. With the current
emphasis on style, obsolescense takes place ouickly, old items must be
got out of the way and when desirable new items substituted for them.
Despite its essential soundness, simplication is not always easy to
put through. The retailer hates to see certain items on which his own
customer8 may make occasional purchases disappear from a line. The manu-
facturer who simplifies in the face of the retailer* s opposition must
always face the danger that a competitor anxious to curry favor will offer
the retailer what he wishes. Nevertheless there is much to be gained by
simplication.
The need for more economic production during the World war gave the
impetus to associated action for simplification and standardization.
Through the Commercial Bconomy Board of the Council of National Defense,
and later the Conservation Division of the War Industries Board each industry
was requested to organize in order to consider the opportunities for sim-
plification and submit specific recommendations. This method of putting
the responsibility on to the business men themselves proved an excellent
stimulus to thought, for as the various manufacturers gathered data con-
cerning the multiplicity of styles and models, many realized more clearly
than ever the wastefulness of unregulated production variations.
In July 1917, The War Industries Board was organized for the purpose
of controlling all purchases for war purposes, conserving resources essen-
tial to the prosecution of the war, and carrying on » multiplicity of other
functions calling for centralized control.

It controlled the awarding of contracts, the fixing of prices, the
allotments of raw materials, power and labor. Non-essential industries,
such as super luxuries, were discouraged, essential industries were en-
couraged. Its economies through standardization were great* It saved
50,000,000 yards of wool, 260,000 tons of tin plate... cut shoe colors from
81 to 6, etc., etc. When the armistice was signed the War Industries Board
had prepared conservation programs for 269 industries. It was estimated
that these programs would yield an annual saving of 15% in the nuantity of
materials used in the United States.*
The standardization work of the American Petroleum Institute has dated
from its St. Louis meeting of 1923. The program of the Institute is one of
the most complete and thorough to be found in any industrial field and is
probably unique with respect to the speed and energy with which it was
organized and set in productive operation.
The simplification, standardization and improvement of well oil-drill-
ing equipment ,was felt to be 8 national problem in the drilling field
existing at that time, was accentuated, to a considerable degree, by the chaos
of sizes, shapes and Quality of drilling equipment and parts. "It was
almost unbelievable. . .how little the ordinary operator knew about the material
he was using. There were 20 odd different grades of steel used in pipe by
various manufacturers. No two used the same tapered thread or the same
character of connections. There were hundreds of different tool joints not
interchangeable, millions of dollars worth of stock because of various
notions about a particular joint for a desired purpose when half that mater-
ial would ordinarily be required.
#
Trade Associations of manufacturers or producers of raw, semi-finished
or finished producers
>
goods have made great progress in standardization.
* "Industrial Standardization." p. 12.
# Ibid. p. 88.
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An Automobile is 70$ minor part 9. In one year General Motors reduced
the variety ot these 84$ thus-
1. Reducing the cost of parts.
2. Simplifying service problems.
3. Benefiting part makers.
4. Affording purchasers better value.
The parts were reduced from 13,000 to 2,100.*
(c) SIDELINES
.
We have noted the successful application of the policy of selling at
cost or thereabout in the case of elastic-demand articles like clothing as a
means of keeping a plant busy in off seasons. The policy degenerates into
tk stampede of price slaughter at a time of general depression such as set
in during the latter part of 1920. Such price cutting can be used as a
desperate makeshift to "get out from under" accumulated stock but not as a
means of keeping a plant busy. When there is no demand or an insufficient
demand for the products of the company to keep its plant busy, the only Al-
ternative to a shut-down is the placing of new articles on the market.
Diversification of product is probably more certain to succeed if the
supplementary "filler" is of the same general type »s the main line, unless
the company can afford to make extensive experiments.
There have been many examples of companies which have added side lines
and have been very successful with them. ~i?he meat-packing industry is a fine
* Ernest L. Priest. "A Primer of Simplified Practice." p. 17.
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example of this. Formerly many parts of the animals were thrown away as
they were prepared for market, but now all or practically all of the animals
are used in one way or another.
Some of the advantages of diversifying or the adding of sidelines ares-
minimum production costs, reduction of selling costs, lower packing and
shipping expense, better use of by-products «nd scrap, and the greater
variety of work breaks shop monotony.
Although a policy of diversification may bring definite and important
advantages to a seasonal business it also imposes definite and important
difficulties. The concern which is trying to decide whether to bid for new
business by adding new products can afford to overlook neither the one
nor the other. When one adds a new product there is the chance that the
present selling force will not be able to handle its sales adeouately. The
present dealer outlets may prove the wrong distributive channel.
(?) LONG TIME POLICIES.
There are two ways to run a business, let the things h»ppen; then adjust
to fit the events, or, to forecast possibilities; then mold events to get
the results you want.
There have been numerous instances in which the individual business
man, by conducting his business with reference to the business cycle, has
avoided dangerous over-extension of inventories and fixed capital which in
many other instances resulted in unemployment and business failure during
the cycle.
While the individual can not in any large way influence the general
situation or entirely avoid the losses incurred in periods of depression
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he can in most cases by foresight keep his business fundamentally sound.
By proper planning, the business cycle, may in a sense, be partially
controlled. We have available a number of professional services which
are exceedingly valuable over a period of years. These include among others
the "Bab son" the "Brookmire" and the "Harvard."
There has been an increase in the use of scientific forecasting by
individual companies, including the Dennison Manufacturing Company and the
Walworth Manufacturing Company.
Business forecasting reauires four things)
1. The collection of data, (statistics)
P. Knowledge of Economic principles.
3. Perspective based upon the past.
4. Good sound judgement.
The Federal Reserve Bo»rd by the elasticity of bank credit, by the
elasticity of note issue, by the control of credit, by the function of the
Board, that is, by the careful use of pressure and by the psychological
effect, may have some adjusting influence upon the business cycle.
There are available indices for practically every type of industry
and for general conditions »s well» These indices vary in reliability
but by the artful choice, suitable results are obtainable.
The policy of looking ahead has demonstrated its value in so many
fields of business operation that it is natural th»t industrial executives
should try to make of forecasting as scientific and accurate a tool as
possible for stabilizing plant activity or where that is impossible, for
being forewarned of impending changes. Various trade indices, *hile not
an infallible guide of what to expect, have nevertheless proved helpful in
understanding certain phenomena which exert a considerable influence on
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business conditions. Blind faith in these barometers is likely to have
conseouences as unfortunate as a complete disregard of them, but used
with discretion they have proved of considerable help in planning for
the future.
The business cycle, in all probability, can never be entirely con-
trolled, but by the correct use of the "Services*' available, by the use of
scientific forecasting, and by the actions of the Federal Reserve Board
the severity of the business cycle should be somewhat minimized.
The practice of looking ahead and planning soundly for the future has,
as an indirect result, the avoidance of wide fluctuations in size of work-
ing forces. During a period of buoyancy it is not necessary that a possible
reaction be discerned on the horizon, for the policy of sound planning for
the future to bear fruit. The tempt«tion at such a time for over-expansion
can be held within conservative bounds by an examination of past history, of
growth over a long swing, which will show what is safe to expect in the
future. If expansion can be held to a rate of growth which may reasonably
be expected to be maintained, there will be no need, when the inevitable
decline sets in, of cutting away a mush-room-like growth to restore the busi-
ness to a healthy condition.
Planning production in advance and with reference to the business cycle,
laying out extensions of plant and equipment ahead of immediate requirements,
with the object of carrying through such construction plans during periods
of low prices in conformity with the long-time trend, the accumulation of
financial reserves in prosperity in order to mark down inventories at the
peak, and the maintenance of a long view of business problems rather than
a short view, will enable firms to make headway toward stabilization.
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The flrn which approaches a period of depression in the strongest
financial condition is most likely to he able to give its workers steady
employment, provided it has planned properly.
Mass production is predicated upon constant production, and it is
expensive if the operation is halted or stopped. Under such a system it
not infrequently happens th«t fifty per cent, of the cost of an article
is due to plant stoppage, for that cost continues whether the plant is in
operation or not. That is why a business is often encouraged to sell its
out-put at a loss. If the planning is done correctly we can avoid the loss
and insure the plant of continuous operation when keyed to meet the demand
and not to exceed it.
*
It is easy to cut a price, but it is difficult to reconstruct the
price structure after it has once been pulled down. The constant lower-
ing of prices is an endless process. In this downward trend of prices
there comes a time when the selling prices are below the cost of production,
profits are dissipated, and the business is conducted at a loss. In this
wild scramble for volume, industry must le«rn that distress lurks just ahead
and the only remedy lies in the rationalisation of output and systematic
forecasting.
The cautious anticipation and advance planning of our progressive
firms is further illustrated by the following statement of Henry Pordt
"Also we do not want to be held up in production or have the expere e
of production increased by any shortage in a particular material so we have
for most p*rts worked out substitute materials. Vanadium steel, for
* Scovill H«mlin. "The Menace of Overproduction. " p. 77.

instance, is our principal steel. With this steel, we c»n get the great-
est strength with the least weight, but it would be not good business to
let our whole future depend upon being able to get vanadium steel. We hare
worked out a substitute. All our steels are special, but for every one
of them we have at least one or possibly several, fully proved and tested
substitutes. And so through all our materials and most of our parts. In
the beginning we made very few of our parts snd none of our motors. Now
we make all of our motors and most of our parts, for we find it cheaper
to do so. But also we aim to make some of every part so that we cannot
be caught in any market emergency or be crippled by some outside manufac-
turer being unable to fill his orders."*
Planning worked in the case of the War Industries Bo«rd. Quite
true there was a decided emergency existing at the time. Wastes in industry
were eliminated, excessive lumbers of designs, etc., were eliminated, costly
elements of competition were eliminated, it insured a. steady supply of goods
it provided stability of prices °t the lowest possible level*
(3)
RESERVE WORK, REPAIRS, IMPROVEMENTS
The slack time of industries, and there may be sl«ck time even with
the best of management and planning, may be used to stabilize the work-
ing week by using the men who otherwise might be idle, in doing odd jobs
around the plant such as repair work, painting, etc. There are companies
that plan building operations for the periods of depression and specify that
much of the labor, for the construction, be taken from the employees
of the companies.
Moreover, the business m«n whose business has developed to a point
* H. Feldman. "Regular ization of Employment." p. 116.

where the demand for his finished product is in excess of the capacity to
produce is always beset with the arguments of his sales organization desir-
ing to see plant capacity balanced with the apparent selling capacity, and
on the other hand by the salesmen of construction companies who, like his
own salesmen, assure him that construction costs in the future will in-
evitably be higher than they are at present. While it is desirable, there-
fore, to postpone as many types of permanent construction work as possible
until periods of depression, the real hope that this en be accomplished as
a matter of wide poliGy is dependent on the possession by business men of
data showing fundamental conditions with reference to periodic fluctuations.
(4) ECONOMIES,
(a) ELIMINATION OF WASTE.
Excess and idle capacity represents a loss of time and energy involved
in its creation. The public which buys the output of the active portion of
an industry is compelled to pay the carrying charges for the idle portion.
The system is economically unsound.
The Wool Institute reported in 1927 a mill capacity of $1,750,000,000
against an actual production of $656,000,000.*
The printing traces are 50 per cent, over-equipped, while paper mills
are now suffering acutely from overproduction.*
The machine-tool industry has run at 65 per cent, of capacity for the
past ten years.
*
American cement mills have a developed cpacity for 260,000,000
barrels a year. The present demand is for 150,000,000. In other words
we have forty per cent, more capacity than dem«nd.*
* Harry W. L« idler. "Unemployment and Its Remedies." p. 90.
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Herbert Hoover, when Secretary of Commerce, said that:
"The primary duty of organized society is to enlarge the lives and
increase the standard of living of all of the people. The whole basis of
an increased standard of living, of "better human relations, of national
progress - indeed, of the advancement of civilization - is the continuous
improvement of the production and distribution.
"While we currently assume that great advancements in living standards
are brought about by new and basic inventions, an even larger field for the
advancement of those standards is found in the steady elimination of our
economic wastes. V<e have probably the highest ingenuity and efficiency of
»ny nation. Yet our industrial machine is far from perfect. The wastes ...
all ... combine to represent a huge deduction from the goods and services
we might all enjoy if we could but eliminate these. ...
"The necessity of maint°ining a high-wage level requires that all proc-
esses of manufacture and distribution he reduced to the lowest possible
eost. This m»y be done by the elimination of those wastes arising out of
too high a degree of diversification in certain basic products. Today
dozens of different sizes, styles, types, and patterns of the most common-
place articles are placed on the market by manufacturers who must possess
special equipment and skill to produce these endless variations. Merchants
Accumulate great stocks that turn but slowly because of the excessive
diversity and l«ck of interch»ngeability in their components. Because of
this situation many manufacturers and distributors favor cooperation for
simplification and standardization.
"The saving in national effort through such cooperation, aa demonstrated
by many well known examples of simplification and standardization, runs into
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millions of dollars. There is a great are» still untouched in which the
application of these waste eliminating measures may well save not millions
but billions. The consenuent reduction of manufacturing, selling and dis-
tribution costs, and the release, for active use, of millions now tied up
in slow moving stocks, combine to yield savings eventually reaching the
consumer in lower prices, thus increasing his real wages and assisting him
to a higher standard of living. The rate of our advance must be, and will
be, in proportion to the extent in which we all cooperate for the elimination
of waste. H *
The bituminous coal industry is an illustration of a bad situation in-
volving loss alike to capital and labor. If we are going to have continuous
prosperity in the bituminous coal fields, it is necessary to organize the
industry as a whole and to take out of production - so far as may be- sub-
marginal mines; and concentrate it in the more prosperous fields, and to
limit production to effective demand. Only in this way may labor receive
continuous employment and fair wages, and enormous loss of capital be
avoided. How this is to be brought about is not easy to say; but certainly
it means that those in the industry must work together on a definite basis.
(5) COORDINATION OF PRODUCTION WITH THE SALES DEPARTMENT.
Give «ny firm assurance of distribution of a certain volume of goods,
and it should have little difficulty in regularizing employment; the technique
of production planning has already advanced to the point that makes exact
scheduling possible. The inability to gear production to normal requirements
is forcing industry to sell below cost; below the cost of upkeep of the capital-
labor investment. It is forcing cut-throat competition between industries and
•Krneat L. Priest. "A Primer of Simplified Practice. " pp. 3-5.

nations. The gap between supply and demand tends to grow wider and wider.
Production and employment could be kept at a constant level if the
balmcing were done on the side of consumption, and the public, instead of
buying what it wanted, were compelled to take what was given it. Russia,
in conducting such an experiment, is the only country over which the shadow
of unemployment has not fallen.* Production has been stabilized, but by
saying what food the people shall eat, what clothes they shall wear, and
drawing the pattern of existence to which their lives shall conform. It
is inevitable that any prescribed level of living shall be a lower level
than that which would be attained by the exhilarating stimulus of indivi-
dual striving.
Proper coordination between the production and distribution departments
may be brought about in part by distribution research, diversifying the
product, modifying the extremes of style changes, getting tae customers to
buy more regularly, securing orders well in advance of the needs of dealers
and seeking new markets.
The Campbell Soup Company is in a position to sell as >nany cans of
tomato soup as it can produce. It has no difficulty, therefore, in obtain-
ing future orders. This in turn enables it to contract with the farmers
for the amount which must be grown. 'Futures' are also sold in pea soup.
In general, it should be pointed out that in the canning industry future
orders have been fairly easy to obtain despite hand-to-mouth buying.**
While the Dennison Manufacturing Company was turning away orders for
their products at the height of prosperity in 1919-1920, the company devel-
oped two new products, one a crepe paper hat for festive parties and the
other the use of sealing wax as a plastic material for objects of art and
* "Business Cycles and Unemployment." p. 175.
** Edwin S. Smith. "Reducing Seasonal Unemployment." p. 1?0.
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adornment. At the time these products were developed, the company was the
largest producer of sealing wax in the country and one of the largest makers
of crepe paper, which it had originated. To have put the new products on
the market would have required new buildings «nd machinery. Nearly every-
one at the time was making such extensions; competing for the labor, mater-
ials and equipment of the building industry and causing prices already in-
flated to soar still higher. Not so the Dennison Company.
#
(a) STIMITATED BY ADVERTISING.
When business depression sets in, the cry goes out to "reduce your over-
head". Business experts counsel it, trade papers admonishingly repeat it,
b»nks insist upon it, comp°ny presidents order it, «nd pl«nt executives ruth-
lessly apply the pruning knife. One of the first items in overhead to go
by the board is advertising.
Be»ring in mind the recurring phases of the business cycle, what should
be the policy of the manufacturing concern which normally sets aside a cer-
tain amount of money for advertising? To this, as to many other questions
th^t have been discussed, the Dennison Company contributes a most considered
judgement. It advocates a normal «nnu«»l appropriation for advertising. In-
stead of spending the actual appropriation year by ye«r, however, this com-
pany »elieves in spending it sparingly in good years, when orders are plenti-
ful and accumulating the savings from the appropriations of the preceding
years to be spent during the depression, when increased selling efforts must
be made to maintain the volume of business.*
This policy seems not only sound and in harmony with the general
policy of trying to flatten out the curve of the business cycle, but it
# "Business Cycles and Unemployment." pp. 122,3.
• Ibid. p. 126.
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seems also to be within the me»ns of most of the concerns which do national
advertising.
( 6 ) REGULATION OP TIME.
(a) AVOID OVERT DO?.
As a usual practice it is advisable in an industrial plant to avoid »s
far as possible the overtime work. If the work which would ordinarily be done
after the regular hours were spread over a period when work w»s likely to be
slack, the employment would tend to be more stable. However this is not al-
ways possible, for "rush jobs" have a way of getting in and they must be done
and done nuickly, with the result that overtime work must be used.
(b) CUTTING WORK DOWN TO PART TIKE.
When work is slack it is Almost imperative that the workers' time of
employment be cut down, or certain workers dispensed with.
Some companies have found this division of work unsatisfactory for the
reason that the most desirable employees are usually the most ambitious, and
if part time operation is too long continued these employees seek other work
where they m*y earn more. As result, after a protracted depression the com-
pany may find itself with a residue of the least competent workers when
more active oper«tion is resumed. One company aptly described it as "the
survival of the unfit."*
In the event that it is necessary, for one reason or another, to reduce
production, this result may be accomplished in different ways. One method
is to reduce the working force to the point where the employees who
remain are just sufficient to produce the desired output with full-time
operation. An alternative method is the retention of the whole or most
• "Lay Off and Its Prevention." p. 27.
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of the existing working force and the distribution of the available work:
Among them, on some enuitable basis*
(c) STAGGERING EMPLOYMENT.
A popular suggestion among many business men for dealing with unem-
ployment has recently been the "staggering of jobs," during periods of
depression. This policy of staggering jobs, however, while preventing
the abject destitution of m«ny workers, would in no sense increase the pur-
chasing power of the workers, nor would it de»l in any fundamental way with
the causes of unemployment. Yet, it is better to have 100$ of the employees
work 80$ of the time rather than 80$ of the employees working 100$ of the
time.
(d) INTER-DEPARTMENT COORDINATION AND TRAINING OF MANY JOBS
INSTEAD OF ONLY ONE.
The economic advantage in many industries of maintaining intact the
stable force of skilled workers despite seasonal fluctuations in demand had
moved a number of manufacturers frankly to attempt employment stabilization
measures within their plants, irrespective of policies designed to regular-
ize production by more aggressive selling or any other method outlined.
They have sought stabilization of their own working forces by the
careful instruction of workers in more than one type of work. The workers
are then transferred from job to job to keep them employed, and in some
instances are used for repair work, cleaning up, pointing up, etc.
The desirability of transferring the worker rests largely on his ability
to m*ke the change with a minimum of loss to himself and to the company.
Unskilled and semi-skilled employees may be transferred with little trouble;
but in the case of occupations reauiring skill or special knowledge, such

changes can be accomplished only when a contingency of this nature has been
foreseen and provided for by teaching the worker a variety of operations in
the course of his employment.
For example, the automotive plant has made it a practice to institute
freauent transfers so that the workers will know a number of operations.
The company reports that this scheme prevented favoritism, kept workers
from "getting in a rut," and brought to light a number of promising men who
might otherwise have worked for years without recognition.*
Other companies have used the slack period to teach the workers a
variety of operations.
It should be noticed that considerable balance may be maintained
by securing versatility in only a small proportion of the labor force.
This may be seen when a firm organizes a special s^uad, one of the best
known instances of which is the "Flying Squadron" of the Goodyear Tire and
Hubber Company of Akron, Ohio.
This squadron was first established as an experiment to secure a more
perfect balancing of production than the other methods Allowed and, at the
same time, to c*pit«lize the opportunity offered of building up a group
thoroughly trained in the rubber industry and capable of promotion. A
three year course of training has been set up, »nd the instruction so ar-
ranged that the firm manages to get the men over »11 the major production
operations in th»t time. In addition to the shop training the men attend
regular school classes one hour a day during the entire period, and such
subjects as rubber manufacture, organization and management, and business
economics are t»ught. ... The »im of the firm is to have this flying
squadron include about 5/0 of the total number of factory employees. This
* "Lay Off and Its Prevention." p. 16.
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proportion, according to the personnel department, balances production
successfully.
*
A few companies have successfully stabilized employment by creating
a labor supply department to meet the demands for additional labor made by
the various sections throughout the plant. Instead of hiring extra men for
a busy dep°rtment, or to fill in when the regular employees °re absent, »
requisition is made against the workers maintained by the labor supply
department. These men do all the odd jobs about the mill when not occupied
in the various departments. When a permanent vacancy occurs in any depart-
ment, those in the labor supply are given the first opportunity to qualify
for it.#
Inter-departmental transfer is °n element in regularizing employment.
For example, in Sears, Roebuck and Corapaiiy, the huge Chicago mail-order
house, the payroll for the toy department varied during 1923 from 80 in
June to 800 in the middle of December. If arrangements for shifting workers
between departments in accordance with requirements were not practiced, the
irregularity of employment would be extreme.**
* H. Feldm»n. "The Regulariz°tion of Employment." pp. 278, 9.
# Ibid. p. 267.
•* Ibid. p. 268.

57
(E)
STABILIZATION METHODS AttE IN USE IN MANY INDUSTRIES
Many plants throughout the country have made Attempts to stabilize employ-
ment. Some of these have been successful while others have not reached the
go»l th«t was sought. Many of those which h«ve been unsuccessful, are so
because of the most unusu°l depression of the past few years. I sh«>ll relate
some of the activities of some of the establishments to curtail unemployment
and to stabilize employment.
Mr. A. Nash of the A. Nash Company, {the Nation's tailors) of Cincinnati,
Ohio, long preached the feasibility of practicing the Golden Rule in industry.
Ownership by the workers is «n accomplished fact, for the employees of this
company own a majority of the stock: and control the business. He has. «»t the
s«»me time, built up a pl«nt which does »n »nnual business of about ten million
dollars. His desire to treat his employees as he, himself, would wish to be
treated led him to make two moves which are almost without parallel in the
economic world. The first was to urge his employees to join the Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America, so that they might be strong enough to protect
their own interests; and the second consisted of turning over to his workers
the new issues of stock that were based on reinvested earnings. As a result,
the employees, through their stock ownership, now control the Board of Direct-
ors, and consequently the management of the establishment; and in addition
they are completely unionized. There is a system of profit-sh»ring, and also
a fund to provide for employees in periods of involuntary unemployment. The
size of the A. Nash Company does not permit the use of direct democracy form
of industrial government such as is in force in the Columbia Conserve Company;
in their dealing with the company, the Nash employees, as such, are represented

by their union.
In a letter, from the President of the A. Nash Company, dated February 7,
1933, I found that the volume of business has, of course, decreased over the
few preceding years and a shorter working schedule was established for the pur-
pose of maintaining the organization and sharing work with all. The work was
distributed equally, affording an opportunity to continue the entire working
force on a shorter working schedule.
The Hickey-Freeman Company, of Rochester, New York, manufacturers of
better suits and overcoats is another clothing company that has sought to
stabilize the working week.
The Hickey-Freeman Company found that lay-offs in the overcoat shop be-
tween seasons proved very costly. It made «rrangeraents with woolen mills to
purchase cloth in advance of the usual season, at a reduced price. This sav-
ing was passed along to the retailer, provided he placed part of his overcoat
reauirements in advance of the usual selling season. Salesmen for this com-
pany book orders in February for the September delivery, the retailer saving
$2 to $3.50 per coat by ordering at this time. The prices on overcoats are
definitely advanced after February. ... The company states that this arrangement
has made possible steady production in its overcoat shops and steady employment
for cutters.*
Among shoe companies, the J. F. McElwain Company, Nashua, New Hampshire,
is notable for the f^ct that its factories run on practically an even basis
throughout the year. This is largely made possible because it has relatively
few customers, and because of the type of relationship it has established with
these customers. About 80$ of the output is sold to the Thomas McAn stores,
which are owned by the Melville Shoe Company. These two concerns enjoy a
* Edwin S. Smith. "Reducing Seasonal Unemployment." p« 129.
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contractual relationship by which the Melville Company guarantees the factory
its cost of production and each company shares in the profit from the fin«l
retail sales. ... The customers of the McElwain Company, besides the Thomas
McAn stores, are few in number «nd although no contractual relationship exists
with them, a close understanding of their needs makes possible getting orders
early with resulting leveling of production to a much greater ext«nt than is
ordinarily found in the shoe industry.*
Crocker-McElw*in Company and the Chemical Paper Manufacturing Company, a
subsidiary, manufacture fine writing papers, index bristols, covers, and box
boards. They are under the s«me management °nd both plants are located in
Holyoke, Massachusetts. The works council consists of representatives of the
employees in each of the various divisions of the company and two represen-
tatives of the management.
There is comparatively little seasonal unemployment in these organiza-
tions. What irregularities there were, have been ironed out by the management,
through coordination of sales »nd production, provision for storage facilities
and winning the cooperation of the retailers.
While the introduction of improved machinery and methods displaced workers,
it has in some instances meant »n eventu«l increase in numbers.
A strike in M«y 1920, served to crystallize the managements thinking con-
cerning industrial relations. ... In view of the fact that the paper industry
requires for certain of its operations highly skilled, experienced workmen, it
is particularly desirable to keep the turnover low. Some form of protection
against unemployment seemed to offer the most likelihood of achieving this pur-
pose as well as destroying one of the primary causes of labor unrest. On the
basis of records for several years past, it was first concluded that a 52-week
* Edwin S. Smith. "Reducing Seasonal Unemployment." pp. 125, 6.
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employment guarantee for workers who had been employed for 10 years was
feasible. After further consideration the management was willing to guar-
antee uninterrupted yearly income to all workers who had been in the employ
of the firm for five years. It was the avowed purpose of the management
so to shape their policies as to keep their five-year men and as many others
as possible steadily at work instead of paying them for idle time.
The guarantee of employment plan of the Crocker-McElwain and Chemical
Manufacturing Companies applies to wage-earners of five-years or more of
service who tend to comprise °n increasingly large proportion of the tot°l
number employed. Turnover has fallen and regularity of employment increased
during most of the period of the plan*s operation. The management is in-
clined to give the guarantee pl°n much of the credit for the stability of
their force but regularization is due to the company's effort to conduct the
business as efficiently as possible.
The wages made up, which correspond to layoff benefits in certain other
companies, amounted to about one-half of one per cent, of the pay roll in the
period 1921-1928, while contract work, which is chiefly for maintenance,
cost approximately 3 per cent. Company executives are convinced that they
have been largely repaid for this expenditure by increased efficiency.
Nevertheless the burden of maintaining full-time wages is a heavy one in a
depression period, and it is probable that were the management to formulate
a new plan limitations would be placed on the period guarantee.*
The Dutchess 31eachery, of Wappingers Falls, New York, recognizes the
obligation to supply good working and living conditions, and great improve-
ments have been made in these matters. Through a committee of employees,
a joint committee of workers and management, and an employee representative
* "Unemployment Benefits in the United States." pp. 498-510.

on the Board of Directors, the workers are kept in touch with the facts
and problems of the business; and there are definite working Agreements
between employers end employees. But it is not intended that the workers
shall become owners in the business and thus the arrangement fails to meet
a final requirement in industrial democracy, which some other companies
have sought.*
The Columbia Conserve Company, of Indi°napolis, Indian*, has been con-
ducting, during the past fifteen years, a most interesting experiment in
industrial democracy. I sh*ll not attempt to go into the development of
this plan and the history of it. It has^ however, sought and accomplished,
to a certain extent, the stabilization of the working week. This has been
brought about by the careful planning of work in regard to the demand and
also by the shortening of the working week.
The Columbia Conserve Company, with over 100 employees, has adopted
the idea of long vacations as a means of awaiting out slack periods. Hav-
ing used coxisiderable ingenuity in regularizatiOn and found that, never-
theless, a slack sometimes occurs, the firm gives the employees three
weeks' vacation in the summer time and ten days around Christmas time. The
company's policy is that six months after an employee has joined the firm,
or soon thereafter, he is put on a salary basis, with not merely yearly
employment in mind, but actually an intention of life tenure. This, accord-
ing to the president, means that, barring adversity, the firm will take care
of the employees it has to lay off even if this involves months rather than
weeks of vacations.
In the words of William P. Hapgood, the President of the Company:
We are believers in democracy—in the right of each human being to
participate la the important -ctivities which mold his life, to m*»ke the
• Paul F. Gemmill. "Present Day Labor Relations." pp. ?.86, 7.

laws which govern his conduct, or to delegate such power to others of his
own choosing. Ue began to apply this faith in democracy to our own busi-
ness in 1917, and we have the following results to relate:
Our business is controlled completely by our workers, the ownership
of stoc.K: giving its possessor no more rights than those workers who pos-
sess little or no stock. As nany of us, as may wish to do so, sit in coun-
cil to make the laws of our business, and to determine its policies. There
is no longer any fear of unemployment among those of us who have served an
apprenticeship and who have been accepted as satisfactory by our fellows.
e are pflid by the week and ret°ined by the year. We can be discharged
only by vote of our associates. Ho deductions, except by explicit action
of Council, m«y be made from our weekly checks, We are paid when we are
sick, and in our old age we receive pensions sufficient to give us the
comforts of life. These pensions vary with our needs °nd not because of
our position with the Company, toe, and all our dependents, receive complete
medical *nd hospital care without cost to us individually. Each one of
us who has been with the Company for twelve months is given a vacation of
three weeks with full pay. For eight months* service we receive two weeks,
and for four months' service one week.
We believe in payment on the basis of need rather than on the basis of
efficiency. It is our belief that, in a democratic society, not only is
liberty fundamental to the existence of such a society, but approximate
equality of income is essential to the development of that fraternity with-
out which democracy is a creed and not a manner of living.
Under the form of government which we have described, our business
has increased in volume, in profits and in standing with our customers.
iJIost of ua have progressed in the knowledge of our own special work, and
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in the business problems with which all manufacturing concerns have to de*l
—
production, sales, finance. Individually our incomes have increased, our
education has been broadened by the social as well as by the business pro-
blems with which we have^aced, and most of us «re happier than we would
be in a. less democratic society.
Soon, out of the profits of the business, we sh«ll own all its com-
mon stock:, When that time arrives, it is our belief that we sh»ll not only
t*ke entire care of ourselves as we do now without seeking help from other
citizens, but that we shall be able to assist other workers who may desire
our «id, to build similar democratic societies.*
On February 18, 1931, announcement was made by James Gleason, president
of the Gleason Works *»nd chairman of the Industrial Management Council of
the Rochester Chamber of Commerce, that fourteen companies in Rochester h»d
adopted the Rochester Unemployment Benefit Pl»n. Since then five other
companies have come in, and it is expected that others will follow. These
concerns normally employ 28,000 persons, approximately 40 per cent, of the
industrial employees of the city. ...
Before describing the plan, attention should be called to steps which
already have been taken by these companies to reduce fluctuations in em-
ployment. M»ny of them for a number of years have given serious thought
to stabilization methods. Some of them have entirely eliminated seasonal
* William P. Hapgood. "An Experiment in Industrial Democracy. " pp. 47-48.

unemployment «>nd had reduced to 9 minimum, unemployment due to oucine 9
8
depressions. Some of the metnods that have been used »re accurate fore-
cssting of 3«ies, careful planning, scheduling of production, »nd build-
ing up inventories during slack periods, diversification of products,
euucation of public vs. seasonal buying, ch«nging hours to ;ieet ch«nges
in volume price concession during off-seasons.
These companies have also during the present depression done as much
repair »nd maintenance wortc as possible in order to keep the force employed.
All this stabilization worn could not eli .iin rfce the unemployment dur-
in
,
this world-wide depression and the problem remained.*
In the opinion of the m?2nageiaent of these sixteen concerns the plan
will be advantageous to the companies, the employees «nd to the communities
xi% jeneral. Uith the additional incentive provided oy the adoption of »n
unemployment relief plan, employers will undoubtedly strive to find addi-
tional me»n3 to reduce fluctuations in employment. j
The iieuer*»l Electric Company has sought, with other progressive com-
panies, methods to keep the workers cozitinuaily employed. The success of
the plan has su fex'ed with the others, due to the adverse co.iditions, yet
»8 « menns to the end, the company has formulated these plana:
G. £. ?l»n.
.hen business is increasing*
1. Increase the ^or^ing force by adding employees as slowly as pos-
sible.
2. Increase the numoer in especially busy departments by transfer
from other departments.
• "American Industries." pp. 4-5.
i Ibid. p. 9.

3. Besort to overtime in particular departments and generally before
increasing the working force.
4. Postpone plant renewal «»na maintenance work as much as possible.
Employ the men on regular production.
When orders begin to f«ll offi
1. Cease hiring at once.
2. Cut out **11 possible overtime and bring departments down to the
normal week.
3. Transfer people from sl*ck to busier departments.
4. Stimulate the sales department to secure co-oper»tion from custom-
ers »nd get business for future delivery.
5. Build standard apparatus for stock up to .... months shipments,
based on average of last three years sales, adjusted to expectations for
the next two years.
6. See that stocks at all factory and district warehouses are brought
up to this maximum.
7. Use men on maintenance and repair work, bring the plant and equip-
ment up to a high standard.
8. Cut the working week a3 generally and gradually as possible, by
departments.
9. Proceed with construction of increased plant facilities previously
planned, using our own men as far as possible.
10. Drop new employees with less than one year of service - single
people with no dependents and who are most easily spared first - always with
not less than one week's notice.
11. In accord°nce with our custom established for some time, employees

should be told whether it is temporary lay-off due to lack of work, or per-
manent lay-off, and in every instance of permanent l»y-off the usual com-
pensation if any, should he p»id, depending upon the character of work, age
and length of service.*
Under the Proctor and G»mbles plan the workers are guaranteed forty-
eight weeks of employment « year. This, however, does not »pply to all
factories. The compajiy insists upon the purchase of company stock euu»l to
the annual salary. The plan does not provide for those who receive more th»n
#2000. per year. All costs of the plan are borne by the comp»ny.
H. R. Deupree, president of Proctor & (l-mbles, has said in talks
recently that he finds generalities and theories about stabilization very
perplexing, but that nevertheless the management of his company, by setting
years ago the definite objective of steady employment for its workers h»s
come to know business far better than it did.
"I think that you have to start back with willi«m Cooper Proctor almost
fifty years ago now, fresh out of Princeton, full of ideals »nd ideas. Mr.
Proctor came to Ivorydale about 1882, convinced that something had to be
done in regard to the labor situation if a manufacturer was to succeed as
he should succeed commercially. I think that that was his origin«l ide°
and I think he started to work on the labor side of our problems with th*t
in mind. But very shortly he turned over to a view point like this, th»t
if you improve and better the working conditions, the living conditions
of the employee, that automatically would reflect in a better commerci«l
position. I think that for the last forty years Mr. Proctor* s thought in
All of the labor problems has come from that end rather than thinking of
the commercial end first. "#
* "American Industries." pp. 12-13.
# Hoy Dickinson. "Wages and V/e«lth." pp. 48-49.

"I will mention one raore thing. When we build a plant today - for
instance, we built a plant at Baltimore that cost $5, 000,000, and we are
projecting one in California - we build not for a peak production, which
is essential if you don't run uniform, we build for a uniform production;
and every dollar's worth of material that is put in there is used 365 d«ys
a year. We get service out of our money invested, and we are not build-
ing for peaks, we are building for uniformity.
"I will say one thing more, for someone has intimated that we have a
very steady, even-flowing, easy-going business. I «m going to tell you
something. A man said to me today - a large banker who is in industry:
'Well, could you do that if you were producing pianos or automobiles or
crushing 3Ugar cane?' He happened to hit somewhere near home when he
mentioned sugar cane, because we crush cotton seed. 1 didn't answer him
on pianos or automobiles, because I don't know anything about them. I
answered him, though, on cotton seed.
"Nobody, nobody in industry, has ever tried to run a cotton seed mill
twelve months in the year. In the first place, they didn't know how to
keep the seed fresh. The seed moves in three or fou* months. The average
season is from four to six months to crush cotton seed, ./hen Mr. Proctor
got into that business and put his mind upon it, as he did four years
ago, and found these mills running four months, he nearly died.
"He started to work and had every mill in the South equipped with
large storage tanks, and some of the t«nks cost more th»n the mills, to
store the seed; and then he discovered or found *» way to keep the seed
from molding or heating, which is the danger, until today he is equipped
to run every mill he has, fifteen of them, the entire year. This year
we are running three of them eleven months, and the reason we aren't run-

ning the others is that the Lord wasn't kind and didn't send enough seed
in the locality to let ua run them.
"We haven't »11 cle*r sailing in our business, hut I «m trying to
make the point that once your mind gets running in a certain way; once
you believe in this idea of striving for uniformity of employment, every
time you touch an employment problem your mind runs toward th»t."
"So you will appreciate that the guaranteed employment plan didn't
pop out. It was a sort of culmination of «11 the things that had gone
before it; and when the terrible experience of 1920 came along, Mr. Proctor
in his characteristic way, said; 'It is »11 wrong. With all the plans
that we have in effect, .ath the profit-sharing plan, the pension »nd
benefit, a sickness plan, a plan for buying stock and helping every em-
ployee to do th«t, it is «11 wrong because the main support is missing
and that is a steady job, a job that » m»n can count upon - well,' as he
put it, 'for at least forty-eight weeks of regular work full time.' The
whole structure is wrong missing th»t, and^is very vigorous way, when
A
once he had made up his mind that a thing was right, he went out to find
a solution, and he found it as far «s our business is concerned. And
about 1923 he put into effect his plan of guaranteed employment which in
effect is n guarantee of the forty-eight full weeks' work.
"We do limit it this way, that a man must work six months with us
before he is eligible to the plan. V«'e must have »n opportunity of judging
whether or not a man is of the proper type; we must have an opportunity
of judging whether or not he is the kind of man we want around the plant.
We give him the same opportunity to t*ke a look at us to see whether or
not he wants to make his home with ua.

"On the practical side of this plan, we have ° leeway in the sense
that in the six months' period there is » great turnover, there «re «
lot of people coming to work who have not »n ide° of st»ying. I think
it would hurt them to st°y in a job over three or four months, so th»t
there is almost a complete turnover of that force which is eauivalent to
approximately 10 per cent of our labor. This gives us that leeway on
our guarantee of forty-eight weeks to the regular workers.
"In « business like ours the whole procedure is that we estimate
what business we are going to do over a twelve months' period, and we
divide it into forty-nine weeks. Th«t is the first safety valve, so to
speak, that we have. We t»ke the production, divide it by forty-nine,
instead of forty-eight. That alone gives us one week leeway in our
guaranteed employment.
"In « staple business, and there are a number of them, if a man is
on his job »nd knows his business, he ought to be able to guess that
business within 5 per cent, we m«y have » peculiar business, - I don't
know - I know it is different from a lot of them, but over a three-year
period our estimates of our shipments did not vary two per cent, of the
tot«l. In other words we were within two-thirds of 1 per cent, each year.
"Mr. Proctor believes in what he calls an economic security. When
I ouizzed him on that he said: 'I mean a job security, a security of
a job. ' Then if a man is willing to work he should be given an oppor-
tunity of working.
"The greatest difficulty, if you want to know it, in putting in
the steady employment basis, is that the entire management of the comp«ny
must assume the responsibility for the continence of that employment.

I will pu^in another way. Once he starts that schedule, that schedule
goes.
"It has helped us in our business, and it has helped us better to
plan our business. It has been of value. It has brought down the cost.
I want to mention that it has decreased our cost over a period of years
as near as our people can estimate, it is entirely responsible for the
familiarity of the person with the job, it has been a potent factor in
reducing cost per unit to produce. It has not increased cost per unit.*' *
The Dennison Manufacturing Company, of Pramingham, Massachusetts,
was among the pioneers of the establishments of this country to recognize
the importance and the responsibility of the employer to t«ke care, in
one way or another ,°5the men in its plant who became unemployed. In 1916,
the company set up a plan to compensate and insure the workers against
unemployment. The cost of the plan was to come from the profits of the
company. The Dennison Manufacturing Company has found, along with many
other companies that have attempted to aid the workers in this way, that
relationships between the employer and the employees have become much
finer, that unemployment ra*y be curtailed, and that the industrial work-
ing week may be stabilized to a great degree.
Among other companies having unemployment benefits and attempts of
stabilization are:
Rockland Finishing Company, Inc. S. C. Johnson and Son
United Diamond Workers, Inc. Leeds and Northrup Company
John A. Manning Paper Company, Inc. American Cast Iron Pipe Company
Manning Abrasive Company, Inc. Brown and Bailey Company
Consolidated Water Power and Paper Company
* Hoy Dickinson. "Wages and Wealth." pp. 44-47.

(F)
THE ATTITUDE OP THE AMEIUCAW FEDERATION OF LABOR
The American Federation of Labor has taken a very active interest in
the problem of unemployment and its related subjects. This is, of course,
easily understood since the membership of the Federation is composed of men
who are greatly concerned with the problem.
President William Green, of the Federation, is naturally the spokesman
for his group. He has in the past expressed the attitude of the Unions. In
1931, President Green, giving the program of the American Federation of Labor,
stated:
1. "We propose the immediate operation of the five-day week and the
shorter wortc day in all public and private industry.
2. The maintenance of the wage structure and wage standards.
3. Work assurance, - a guarantee to all those workers who are employed
that they are secure in their positions and through the application of the
shorter work-day and the shorter work-week, all would be accorded an oppor-
tunity to share equitably in all work available.
4. The prohibition of child labor and the employment of adults in order
that the slack of unemployment may be t^ken up.
5. The stabilization of those industries, with particular reference to
those which are classified as seasonal in character.
6. The application of a more scientific plan of industrial production
ao that a stable balance may be mainlined in order that production may be
carried on systematically over longer periods of time."*
Again, President Green suggests: "The consuming reuuirements of industry
are very great. Interruption of the consuming power of the people is immed-
* "Community and Industrial Unemployment Relief and Prevention." p. 52.

iately reflected in the reduced volume of good3 sold. This in turn results
in unemployment and economic confusion.
"Steady, continuous employment with an annual income for wage earners
would overcome this condition. Workers would buy and use if they would "be
guaranteed continous employment with annual income. They would plan over
the yearly period rather than the daily period. They would avail themselves
of credit facilities and thus their annual buying and consuming power would
be exercised beyond their annual earning power. Here is where management c°n
serve industry through the application of orderly planning of production over
a yearly period.1*
Occasionally, a man like William Green and others, in the American L*bor
movement, mentions the yearly wage, but few men in management seem to speak of
it. Yet it is the yearly wage that interests the mason, the painter, the
mechanic as well as the soap maker in the plant of Proctor and G°mble.
Security and the chance to plan ahead, to know what one can count on, is far
more important than the high daily wage.
It is interesting to discover, on examining the pay records of indivi-
duals who are thought to be highly paid, that the number of days 1 work a
year, even in a good year in so many lines, averages about 120.
The average yearly pay of all carpenters in the country, for example
is not as some would have us believe 300 x #14 - #4200, but much nearer
110 x £14 - #1540, and even that is high.#
Credit for forcing reduction of the hours of labor must go to the labor
unions; but, in a remarkably few cases has the reduction been made for the
purpose of aiding the solution of the unemployment problem.
It is evident, however, that the shortening of hours cannot by itself
* Roy Dickinson. "Wages and Wealth." pp. 32, 3.
# Ibid. p. 33.
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offar * complete cure for unemployment . Recognizing this, the American
Federation of Labor has put forward another important proposal to regularize
employment. In the words of the last Report of the Executive Council, "While
individual production establishments must v/ork out the problem of stabilization
for themselves, there is needed in addition, te«m wortc by the whole industry
and te»m work between «11 industries. To accomplish this there should be
comprehensive planning by an advisory board, representative of «11 production
and consumer groups. Such a national economic council should plan the machinery
for achieving economic equilibrium, and undertake to secure the co-operation
of voluntary associations and government agencies in a co-ordinated undertak-
ing."*
It will be seen that this scheme for "national planning" goes far beyond
the boundaries not only of the technological problem but *lso of regularizing
production in any particular industry. It aims at nothing less than so co-
ordinating the activities of industry as a whole »nd so conditioning them to
consumption so as to avert even cyclical depressions. It reaches down to the
fundamental problem of discovering «nd applying n "techniaue of balance" with
a view to avoiding the most formidable type of unemployment such as is created
by a general decline in business activity.
The remedy of the shorter working week has been advocated by the American
Federation of Labor for many years past. The first item in their program for
meeting unemployment is the institution of the five day week of thirty hours.
Already considerable advance has been made in this direction. A clear distinc-
tion must be drawn, however, between short time and a shorter working week.
The former is simply a temporary expedient for curtailing production and spread-
ing out the available vork by employing the same number of persons for fewer
hours with correspondingly reduced earnings. The latter is a permanent reduc-
* H. B. Butler. "Unemployment Problems in the United States." p. 95.
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tion of hours of labor, and unless the same weekly wages are paid as for the
longer period, the earnings and purchasing power of the workers will he pro-
portionately reduced. There can be little doubt that a further curtailment
of hours will result from the increased facilities of production.
This process has already brought about « progressive reduction of the
standard week from seventy-two to sixty, from sixty to fifty-four °nd from
fifty-four to forty-eight and loser in the last hundred years. The shorten-
ing of hours has gone hand in hand with the improvement in real wages, and
there is no reason why the same tendencies should not continue in the future.
Their development is, however, conditioned by the development of productive
efficiency and purchasing power. In industries where economic conditions »re
favorable, shorter hours will gradually be adopted without involving any dim-
unition of wage rates. In some cases such measures may be expected to increase,
or at least to stabilize, the number of persons employed in the industry and
thus to mitigate the effects of technological displacement.
American employment reached its peak in 1918, production reached its
peak in 1929. If this country returned today to the boom production of three
years ago, 45 per cent, of the 12,000,000 unemployed would still be without
work.
The Federation has taken its stand none too soon. The five-day week seems
inevitable. It is sound economically, it is desirable socially. It must come
sooner or later, and there is no advantage in waiting passively for its advent.
It is incumbent upon government, labor, and business to speed its arrival. On
the other hand many view the progressive reduction in working hours with dis-
favor. They resent the interference of labor and other outside organizations
in matters of plant administration and are generally opposed to legislative
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regulation of internal operations. They maintain that hours of work should
be a matter of free individual contract between employer and employee.*
The length of the working day should constantly be decreased with the
increase in the productivity of labor. President Green estimates that the
average workman produced in 4 hours in 1929 as much as he produced in 7§-
hours in 1919. The American Federation of Labor recorded itself as favoring
the five day week at its Annual Convention in 1930, and declared that 48
national and international unions, chiefly in the building trade and the
clothing industry, were in part enjoying that work-week. President Green,
at the Progressive Conference in March, 1931, declared that the Federation
would urge Congress at its next session to place government employees on a
5 day week, and in this way to furnish moral and financial support to the
effort to overcome unemployment.§
In the winter of 1930-31 bills were introduced in a number of legis-
latures providing for the five day week.
The demand for shorter hours as one of the ways out of the present dilemma
is also being pressed by some of our engineers. Thus the Employment Code
adopted by the Taylor Society, in December, 1930, reads:
"It is vo be expected that the world's increased productive capacity
should result in increased leisure for the workers, and it is to the advantage
of the proper balance between production and consumption that industry should
not be too slow to reduce daily and weekly hours as higher levels of output
are permanently attained. "#
This demand is likewise oeing voiced in ever increasing volume by
European labor... The introduction of the paid holidays for workers is
another demand that should he pressed.#
* "The Five Day Week in Manufacturing Industries." p. 13.
# Ibid. p. 7.

Free vocational education should "be extended, so that the workers from
industries in which the demand for labor is decreasing .aaj he rapidly fitted
for other lines of effort. If protection is appliei to our veterans of w»r,
why not to our veterans of industry?
The labor unions in the past have used the "strike" to marked advantage
in the securing of their aims, especially toward the lowering of the working
week. In fact, the union had the advantage not only when it organized the
workmen in John Brown's mill but the workmen in twenty or a hundred mills in
the same industry. Then, vhen John Brown's workmen went on strike, the
workers in the other mills would contribute to support the strikers *nd
enable them to hold out long enough so that John Brown would be forced to
capitulate.
Inevitably combinations among the workmen stimulated combinations
among employers to fight the battle against organized labor. Following com-
binations came consolidation; and wherever this has proceeded far, it has
practically ended the chance of an even-handed bargain between the employer
and the employee.
If the employees of the Brown mill in 3uffalo go on strike, the cor-
poration that owns that mill and a dozen or fifty other mills can shut down
the Brown mill until the strikers are willing to come back.
The result has been that in the industries where consolidation has gone
the farthest, labor unions have practically lost their power to protect the
wage-worker.
*
The shorter working week, if adopted generally would make a marked step
forward in the stabilization of the industrial working week, for, the work
could be apportioned better and would tend to keep the work "spread out."
* Charles w. Baker. "Pathways Back to Prosperity." pp. 268, 9.

Labor's Attitude toward the introduction of new machinery and new proces-
ses has been in the making for many years. Going b»ck in industrial history,
in the very infancy of machine production, «n antagonism to labor-s»ving
machinery that has often resulted in bloody struggle. The introduction of
the power loom, it will be recalled, brought a storm of protest from the hand
weavers that resulted in the breaking of both looms and heads. It may be
questioned whether a new labor-saving device has ever been accepted by the
workers without a struggle. The fact that it is labor-saving is sufficient
to set the workers against it. And naturally enough* One may hardly be
expected to welcome the coming of a machine which will render useless a skill
is
developed over a long period of years. This skill, in most cases, the worker's
sole stock in trade; and he is anxious to keeo it at work as the employer
would be to save his business in the face of threatened competition* But
economic progress and industrial advance demand that improved machinery and
better technique shall be brought into service whenever they will result in
lower costs.*
This attitude of opposition is understandable, but union opposition to
new machinery cannot prevail as has been demonstrated time and again. Applied
widely and effectively, a policy of this kind would mean tremendous loss to
all members of society for the benefit of a comparatively few. If labor is
not justified in benefiting thus at the expense of the general public, no
more, of course, is management. There are frequent rumors, sometimes well
substantiated, of patents being bought and smothered, at least temporarily,
so that employers may not be put to the painful necessity of discarding
machinery rendered obsolete by new inventions. This practice is on a par
with union opposition to new machinery.
* "Unions Provide Against Unemployment
.
H pp. 38, 9.
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In addition to the attitude of the American Federation of Labor on the
shorter working week, it further suggests or has suggested as methods to de-
crease the number of workers and thus to increase the stability of those now
employed, the continued regulating of the supply of workers from abroad, and
the raising of the school age*
There has been a growing sentiment against the employment of children in
industry. This has culminated in the advocation of laws preventing children
from working, until they arrive at a definite age. A strong sentiment exists,
however, in favor of child labor. The question arises as to whether the
elimination of the child labor would have a marked difference in the number of
adults employed or if it would have any definite effect on the stabilization
of the working week. The report of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission
on Unemployment states that;
"The commission recommends a progressive increase in the age at which
children are permitted to leave school for work from 14 to 16 years, to be
taken in two one-year steps, beginning with the school year 1933-34.
This would affect unemployment in two ways:
1. It would keep off the labor market at a critical time some thousands
of children, who, as business recovers, will otherwise take jobs desperately
needed after a long depression by their older brothers and sisters.
2. If the education provided in our public schools accomplishes what is
hoped, some unemployment in the future may be forestalled by the better train-
ing of our children provided in these two critical years of early adolescense.
We are not convinced that the education provided at the present time for those
who stay unwillingly in school is the best that could be given to this group,
but we believe that a longer school life is one of the requisites for build-
ing citizens who will be better equipped than past generations to carry on the
life of our Commonwealth.*
* "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on Un-
employment." pp. 147, 8.

"Although 15,000 children 14 to 15 years old were employed during the
last fairly normal year (1928), and the same number might be employed again
when business is normal, it by no means follows that 15,000 jobs would have
become available for adults, particularly for adult males, if these children
were kept in school. ...
Young boys and girls are hired because they are cheap and because general
ly they can be laid off without qualms of conscience as to family obligations.
If the labor they perform becomes more expensive - because older children have
to be paid more - it is almost a certainty that some of their jobs will be
mechanized or reorganized so as to need fewer workers. This happened to many
common labor jobs - pick and shovel jobs and similar types of work - during
and after the war when corn-ion labor became more expensive. Some of the 15,000
jobs thus would disappear. ...
Many of the jobs commonly given to children provide irregular employment,
almost if not completely casual in nature. ... The result has been a high
rate of unemployment for child labor."*
Some unions of the Federation have agreements guaranteeing employment.
The employers undertake to provide work for the normal work force during a
certain number of weeks each year. Such agreements are in force in the local
unions of the United '..all Paper crafts and in the Cleveland Joint Board of
the International Ladies Garment Workers.
The Cleveland Plantf
"The Garment industry is particularly subject to seasonal unemployment.
In many, centers the seasonal dull periods are so severe as to make the total
annual work period very short. In Cleveland, according to Mr. F« C. Butler,
Manager of the Cleveland Garment Manufacturers Association before the institu-
* "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts 2mer^ency Commission on Un-
employment." pp. 151, 2-3.
# "Unions Provide Against Unemployment. pp. 7-10.
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-fcion of the guarantee plan, "The average ( employment ) probably did not
exceed thirty-six weeks annually." It is not surprising therefore that one
of the most constructive plans to meet the unemployment problem has originated
in the garment industry.
"As an outgrowth of experience with boards of arbitration during the war,
a board of referees and »n impartial ch«ir:nan had been established permanently
for the Cleveland garment market in 1919, by agreement between the Joint Board
of the Cleveland L«dies Garment Workers Loc°l, the Cleveland Garment Manufac-
turers Association and some of the independent manufacturers. The «greeraent
provided for determination of work st«ndards by engineers under joint super-
vision of the union and the manufacturers, and the "uestion of « guarantee
of employment c«me up in connection with new w^ge rates. The final agreement
provided for determination of wort standards by time study under joint super-
vision, and a guarantee of employment for a certain number of weeks during the
year. The plan became effective in July, 1921 and has been in operation since
with a few technical changes.
"The Cleveland plan was the first joint plan for unemployment compens»-
tion in the United States*
"To provide for rush seasons, the manufacturers may hire additional workers
up to 20 per cent, of the force in any dep°rtment, provided that they be em-
ployed for only four weeks in each half year.
"The purpose of the plAn is to provide »n incentive to employers to in-
crease employment time *>nd at the same time protect the workers in case the
employer f*»ils to provide the forty week guarantee.

31
"The method of operation is as follows: Y/hen any worker is laid off invol-
untarily, he receives a lay off slip containing the date of lay off and
when possible the date to return to work. Vj'hen he returns the slip is marked
with the date of return* The worker keeps these slips and as soon as he
accumulates twelve weeks unemployment he may draw half pay from the shop
relief fund, ...
"In spite of the difficulties under which it has operated, the plan has
increased the number of weeks worked per year. This is shown from the re-
cords of the payments from the unemployment funds and amounts saved by the
employers. Records for the Cleveland Garment Manufacturers Association show
that in the first three years of the plan from two to four firms each year
paid out their whole unemployment fund. In 1927 no firm paid out its whole
fund. Records for 1927 show that five firms gave 40 weeks employment and saved
their whole fund; two more provided nearly the full forty weeks and had less
than thirteen per cent to pay; three fell short by a few weeks and paid out
about half of their funds and only one lost nearly all its fund. On the whole
the work season has been considerably lengthened. ••«
"The increase in employment has been brought about in different ways. La
a study made by the 3ureau of Labor Statistics, it is stated:
"The employers have taken risks in cutting garments ahead of sales; they
have added other lines of work; they have increased their sales forces; they
have taken greater chances in purchasing materials in advance, and have accepted
orders to be made up in otherwise idle time without profit or even at a loss.
"The plan has undoubtedly proved an increase to efficiency. There was an
increase in the work in the shops and an indirect gain through increased labor

stability and increased production, resulting from continuity of employment."
Essentials of the plan:-
Each worker is guaranteed 40 weeks employment each year. If the employer
fails to provide employment, the worker receives payments for unemployment as
follows:
Each employer deposits in the unemployment fund 10$ of his total pay roll.
If he provides 40 weeks employment +he fund deposited by him is returned in-
tact, at the end of the year. If not, the amount needed for payments is taken
and the residue return to the employer.
Benefits begin when the employer fails to provide twelve weeks of employ-
ment*
Benefits continue as long as necessary until the employers' fund is ex-
hausted. The fund is administered by an impartial chairman of the industry.*
During the years 1922 and 1927 for a period of six years the average amount
of the fund paid for unemployment was 12 5/l2$ of the fund.jf
Stabilization of employment is one of the fundamental principles of union
management cooperation. Consequently much progress has been made toward sta-
bilization where union management cooperation has been in effect. What the
unions are after is, of course, representatives who will not be susceptible
to suggestions from the management - representatives who will look after the
interests of the workers, first, last and always. They believe that the only
way to have such representatives is to have, as spokesman for the workers,
men who are in the employ of the workers themselves, and not of the business
men with whom they are expected to deal on behalf of the workers. The worker
who is paid by management, and looks to the management for the security of his
position and possibly promotion, can scarcely fail to be influenced, though
perhaps unconsciously, by these items of dependency. The knowledge that he
"Unions Provide Against Unemployment." p.
9.
# Ibid. P. !*•

may lose his job or possible advancement, if he displeases his employer, is
likely, say the union critics of employee representation, to make him timid
in proposing measures that may not be popular with the management, and less
zealous than he should be in insisting upon the worker's rights in the face
of managerial disproval. The criticism is one that cannot be lightly dis-
missed. *
Railway repair work is an occupation subject to severe seasonal fluc-
tuations, owing in part to the heavy demands on railway equipment during
seasons when crops are moved. It has been possible to compensate these
fluctuations to a large extent, and greatly to increase the number of days
worked per year. On the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, during the year 1925
compared with 1924, there was an average increase of employment amounting
to two weeks more work for every man in the shops. This added an average
of $44 per man to the yearly income of the shop men. This benefit was made
possible chiefly by doing ^7,000,000 worth of work in the 3. & 0. shops
which formerly would have been let to outside firms.
#
In the Canadian National shops in the four years ending November 30,
1927 earning opportunity has been increased 14-g- per cent, through stabiliza-
tion and employees now earn an average of Jjj>150 more a year per man.#
The program of stabilization has been put into effect gradually. In
general under union management cooperation, problems of employment are dis-
cussed by a joint committee of union and management representatives. A
program adaptable to local needs and conditions is then worked out. The
following are typical of steps which have been proposed and acted upon in
stabilizing employment;**
It Planning of production and budgeting finances so that certain types
*
''Unions Provide Against Unemployment. ,f pp. 183, 4.
# Ibid. p. 5.
** Ibid. p. 6.

of work not requiring immediate attention may "be reserved for dull periods.
A program of rebuilding locomotives and cars, for instance, provided work
for a number of men in a season when other work was not available. Finan-
cial needs for such work have been met in part in many cases by setting
aside a reserve fund for the purpose. Forecasting of revenues and budget-
ing of expenses are important in such a system of production control.
2. Avoiding contracting out of work. The policy of doing railroad
work in railroad shops has brought back to home shops a large amount of
work which formerly has been let to outside contractors. This additional
work provided employment for the shop forces, and expenses were also cut
down, since home work is less costly*
3. Establishment of a normal or standard work force. The policy is
adopted of keeping a normal number of men employed throughout the year;
avoiding the hiring of new men for rush seasons and consequent layoffs in
dull seasons; limitation of apprentices to a number sufficient to fill
vacancies 'when they become available.
4. Flexible work week, adjustable "between forty and forty-four hours
per week. Since it has not been possible to provide full-time employment
the year around for every man in the work force, it may be advisable to
provide a narrow flexibility in work hours, say, not to exceed ten p er cent.
This arrangement should be under strict joint supervision.
5. Central placement service to act as clearing house for furloughed
employees. On several railroads it has been arranged that furloughed em-
ployees are notified of r-3ancies which occur elsetfh'er* on the system, so
that they may bid for these positions before new men are hired. This has
3erved to provide positions for many men.
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6. Conferences "between representatives of the unions and management
before decisions are made concerning employment. It is only right th«t those
who are to be affected by employment policies should be consulted when these
policies are formed, and union representatives have been influential in deter-
mining the best means to meet an emergency.
From the foregoing it may be observed that the American Federation of
L»bor and the unions which comprise it are «nxious to have employment stabilized
and are working toward that end.

(G)
THE PLACE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE STABILIZATION OF THE
INDUSTRIAL WORKING WEEK.
Many of our industrial leaders seemed convinced that some means of
centralised guidance or control is necessary if our industrial system is
to escape recurrent depressions. Congress is slow to formulate worthy
economic policies "because its duties are largely political and not eco-
nomic. However, under unusual circumstances, such as existed at the time
of the World War, Congress did provide for control, through the War Indus-
tries Board. An unusual situation exists at the present time and action
on the part of Congress is sorely needed.
There has been rather serious question as to whether the capitalistic
system is able to cope with the present situation in this country. Some
have gone so far as to say that the present system is doomed and is no long-
er justified in this nation. Those who take this attitude maintain that
the only system able to cope with the present conditions is a socialistic
one. The capitalistic system has not yet proven itself to be a failure.
I should say that the path of progress is in an evolution of the present
system. In my opinion the danger of a revolution in this country is not
very great, for the American people are imbued with common sense and abil-
ity and do not fear the future with any great alarm.
To lead the country out of the difficulties in which it finds itself,
a three-fold leadership is somewhat desirable. We need the leadership of
a Wilson with a gift of clear enunciation of the forces to be fought and
the goals to be attained, the leadership of a Mussolini with a gift for
decisive action and the leadership of a Ghandi with a gift of moving vast
masses of men by the compelling power of hia sincerity.
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It is quite imperative that the government step into the situation and
insert more control, We are making progress toward governmental control.
We stumbled over cut-throat competition and graft in railroads, and created
the Interstate Commerce Commission. We fell over money panics and built
the Federal Reserve System. We ran into monopolistic dominance and ex-
perimented with the Federal Trade Commission. Agricultural depressions
brought about the Federal Farm Board. We also have The Federal Radio
Commission, The Public Utility Commission, The Federal Power Board and The
Federal Shipping Board. We are now ready for something more and that "some-
thing" is toward the regulation of industry, which will bring about the
stabilization of the industrial working week.
A good system of social control should be democratic, should need to
know what we are going to control, should have power to enforce it, should
have efficient legislative control, should have a minimum of coertion, should
be flexible, should look beyond the immediate future and should improve the
standard of living. Perhaps no plan or system can be all-inclusive of the
above.
Various plans for the government control of industry have been proposed.
Stuart Chase has suggested that a Board patterned after the War Industries
3oard be inaugurated, to be composed of seven members with many minor divi-
sions so that all essential parts are adequately taken care of. Business
surrendered to the War Industries Board primarily on the plea and psycho-
logy of patriotism. Today no flags are flying but the millions of workers
who are unemployed form a menace greater than the Germans at the time of
the War. This Board, The Peace Industries Board, would be challenged with
the opportunity to abolish the human misery which flows from economic malad-
justment. The prime essentials should be the first things to be controlled
followed by reasonable comforts and then luxuries
left for later considera-
tion, if any. A formidable problem would
be the extent to which distribu-

tion should be comprehended. The wastes and leakages of the distribution
system are huge. While the man-power of the production unit goes steadi-
ly downward the man-power per unit of output of factory goes steadily up-
ward. Obviously here is a place for planning and control.
Stuart Chase, along with others, suggests "long ranged planning" on
the part of the Government, based somewhat on the Russian Five-Iear Plan
as an aid in smoothing out some of the difficulties of the present situa-
tion.
Gerard Swope has suggested a plan, which requires all industrial plant
with over fifty employees to enter a trade association which would be under
governmental supervision. This supervision would protect the companies
and the public from wrongful practices. Trade associations have been a
valuable aid to industry and this plan has some merit.
Llany countries have National Economic Councils. Among them are France
Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and Great Britain. Experimental, often
cumbrous, usually ineffective, as these councils are at present, they may
ultimately prove an adjunct of great value to the machinery of government.
These councils differ greatly in form; they work with varying degrees of
success; they are still in the experimental stage and the best methods and
composition, which will not be the same for all countries, have as yet to
be discovered.
*
It has become plainer to those who have watched the operation of the
economic councils of Germany and other countries that bodies which are
based on the balancing of forces between the representatives of employers
and workers are incapable of any real vital constructive achievement,
* Sir Arthur Salter. "Recovery—The Second Effort." p. 250.

Another plan is that suggested by Prof. Warne, of Amherst College.
A thorough going system of social planning, declares Professor Colston
Warne, of Aaherst, would require several apparently simple, but really
complex steps, each taken after months, perhaps years, of preliminary
effort. They would include:
1. The setting up of a statistical bureau to secure the basic data
regarding the resources, the human abilities and the capital of the country.
2. The determination of the basic requirements of food, clothing,
shelter, recreation, medicine, etc. for a comfortable standard of living
for the entire people.
3. The setting up of proper control agencies to see that each industry
produced its allotted budget toward such requirements,
4. The elimination of inefficient and unscientific methods of produc-
tion and distribution.
5. The shortening of hours together with the shifting of labor to in-
dustries formerly regarded as luxury industries for the few, but now indus-
tries to provide additional comforts for the many, and finally.
6. The allocation of capital to new industries and for the extension
of the older ones in accordance with the increased social needs of the com-
munity. *
Such steps, Professor Warne admits, could only be carried out under some
form of social ownership. An increasing number of social thinkers are main-
taining that Professor Warne is right and that no effective social planning
is possible without the shift of industry from individual to production for
service.
Tariffs undoubtedly have their effect on the economic situation of all
* Harry W. Laidler. "Unemployment and Its Remedies." p. 94, 6.
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countries. They often result in higher prices, thus reducing the purchas-
ing power of the masses. Tariffs properly arranged may be a factor in the
stabilization of industry.
Perhaps the most effective way that the government could act for the
immediate profit towards stabilization would be in the passage of the "Black
Bill" now pending in the Senate of the United States. This act provides
for labor, a six-hour, five-day week. One of the plans for the enforcing
of this proposed act is to prevent the transportation of goods, from one
state to another, made in a plant where the six-hour, five-day week is not
used. A question as to constitutionality arises in connection with this
bill, in that it may interfere with the freedom of contracts. This bill
should provide for some lee-way because serious penalty might be inflict-
ed upon certain industries which are unquestionably seasonal, or for certain
other reasons.
If the time of work of one individual is limited by law and the average
of the industrial working week is longer than thirty hours per week, it pro-
vides for the employment of additional labor or what is more important in
this discussion, it means more work for the now employed, which can not be
done beyond a certain fixed legal rate and therefore will tend to spread
the work over a longer period and thus stabilize it.
Whether or not thirty hours is the proper limit to the time, is open
for criticism, but regardless of whether it is or not, it is a step in the
right direction.
The government has a definite place in the providing of plans for sta-
bilization, for it is the only authority big enough to command due respect.
It may be that the right plan has not as yet been brought to light, but
regardless of the plan which may be adopted, in this crisis, suitable pro-

visions should be made in it which would lead to the stabilization of in-
dustry. Our country has long respected the rights of individuals, and no
plan which seriously threatens this position should he adopted.
(H)
STABILIZATION AS IT APPLIES TO THE PRESENT WORLD-WIDE CONDITIONS
The depression, through which we are passing, is not confined to the
United States or to any one country, but it is world-wide in its scope.
Hardly one of the features of this crisis can be described in purely na-
tional terms; the universal fall in prices, the trouble over the maintain-
ing of the gold standard, the fall in the value of silver, the problem of
reparations and war debts, the rise of tariffs and import restrictions, etc.
There is a very natural human disposition when a man feels pain anywhere, to
hope that there is some single specific cause and some specific remedy, but
I am afraid that the malady from which the world is suffering is not of a
simple character; and no single specific panacea will be sufficient. In any
such maelstrom of mental and emotional confusion it is doubtful whether any
man or group of men is wise enough to produce a plan which will solve the
world*s political, economic and social ills. At best it will be a slow and
tedious process, which will grope its way haltingly toward its ultimate ob-
jective. Men are more ready than ever to consider those economic doctrines
and policies which were thought to be unquestionable. The United States must
take an ever-increasing part in world affairs, for she has become the first
economic power in the world, and she has unbreakable international ties.
There is no effective way of handling international affairs on a large
scale. The League of Nations has not been the weapon in the handling of
world affairs that was hoped for it. It has failed to bring about any ef-
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fective unification across national frontiers. The failure of President
Wilson to convert the United States to participation in it wrecked its chances
of transcending European quarrels. The League is still a feeble affair, and
the strengthening of it is made more difficult because it is largely committed
to the defence of the Peace Settlement of 1919 with all of its unsatisfactory
and trouble-making dispositions. France and Germany have remained political
and economic rivals each playing for position and influence in continental
affairs. Meanwhile Great 3ritain hovers uneasily between participation in
the problems of Europe and the attempt to build up her world-wide Empire in-
to a consolidated economic unit. If the world really recognized the brother-
hood of man, or if the League of Nations were a really international force,
all of the countries would be working together to promote the economic devel-
opment of the world as a whole. Selfish nationalism stands in the way.
Attempts have been made by the nations of the world to get together on
various projects. The world Economic Conference held at Geneva in 1927 was one
such attempt and this conference urged the necessity of uniform customs clas-
sifications throughout the world and also general tariff reductions.
The Tariff Truce Conference of London 1929-20 was another attempt to get
together in the solution of economic problems. At this conference the so-
called most-favored-nation clause was introduced which enabled different coun-
tries to make certain beneficial agreements among themselves.
A keystone of an ordered economic system is a money which fulfills its
functions. A concerted world monetary policy, with some sort of an Interna-
tional 3ank as an instrument to help in applying it, would be of inestimable
value to world trade. 3ut it will be both impracticable and useless unless
other policies, in particular commercial policies, are directed to the same
end. The whole question of gold and gold prices is one of momentous irapor-
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tance. Europe obviously wants to get out of the payment of debts to the
United States; for it can see no possible means by which they can in effect
be paid. Europe wants the American tariff lowered, for European manufac-
turers badly need an expanding market for their goods. But assuredly,
America should not forego debts nor lower tariffs simply to suit Europe's
convenience. Having foregone reparations from Germany, the European states
will be in a better position than they now are to approach the United States
and ask for cancellation of War Debts. They are likely to find the United
States in an unreceptive mood unless they are prepared to offer something in
return. Had the countries to whom, in the last resort, reparations are paid
been prepared to take what is due them in the form of additional imports and
to adjust their policies toward that end, reparations and war debts could
have been paid, on a reasonable scale, without disastrous dislocations. Un-
happily this has not been done.
A suggestion has been made that a world price stabilization would be an
aid in the present international confusion. This would involve a need for
a common currency and all the countries would have to give up their power of
regulating monetary conditions, which seems to be an impossibility at the
present time. A world price level would be an exceedingly difficult thing
to secure since different commodities have different values in different coun-
tries.
There is little question that radical revision downward of our present
t riff schedules would be of material aid in the recovery of world trade.
American markets would be opened to foreign goods. The sellers would create
credits with which to furnish the necessary capital to their home industries,
enabling them to pay reasonable wages and make payments for past loans, as
well as future purchases of goods and services, partly and probably chiefly

94
from the United States. The credit tenseness would be lessened. America
would participate greatly in the revival of purchasing power and good-will
in its foreign markets.
The result, however, would hardly be an unmixed blessing. For some
American industries and some American labor the influx of foreign goods would
bring increased competition, lower prices and unemployment. This series is
the inevitable consequence of selling goods and lending money to debtors who
can pay only with goods. So long as America will seek foreign markets for
the goods or repayment of principal and interest on her foreign loans, the
same problem of accepting foreign goods and competition will be automatically
created.
In the light of the present world conditions the stabilization of the
industrial working week appears to have received a serious blow. The curtail-
ment of world trade, largely due to high tariffs, has greatly restricted the
markets for manufactured goods. With the restriction of markets production
has had to be curtailed which has resulted in less work and unemployment.
The stabilization of the industrial working week is dependant, to a large
degree on markets for the goods manufactured. Causes, other than tariffs,
have likewise led to curtailment of production. Domestic markets have been
affected as well as foreign markets because a country can not live of itself
alone and conditions which affect the world adversely likewise affect the
various units of the world. But the situation is not hopeless .for, with the
aid of the government and of industry itself, steps may be taken which will
alleviate some of the conditions and will lead in the general direction of
stabilization.
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(I)
A 8HMUB7 OP THE GENERAL LEANS FOR THE STABILIZATION
OF THE INDUSTRIAL wORxONG WEEK.
There have "been many suggestions made of means to stabilize, either
directly or indirectly, the industrial working week. Not all of these can
be put into force at one time. The industries themselves or the govern-
ment are the only ones capable of putting these plans into effective use.
(A) ON THE PART OF INDUSTRY
If we reduce our industrial system to its most elemental terms we see
that it is a process of exchange. During the past few years there has been
an extensive misdirection in the production of goods. The production and
consumption of goods have been out of balance. In the United States it is
impossible to command just what goods and how many any individual must con-
sume. The consumption of goods must then he determined in another way. As
a balance between production and consumption is maintained the industrial
working week should be more and more stabilized. There are many means adapt-
able to the individual industries which may be put into force without any
outside help. The stabilization of the industrial working week is dependant
upon continued production and anything that will aid toward that end is wor-
thy of consideration.
Among the means which would help to bring about the stabilization of
production and therefore industry are: the elimination of seasonal fluctua-
tions, as far as possible, by distributing the work throughout the year, the
standardization of product, that is the elimination of many sizes, colors,
shapes, etc., the introduction of sidelines where practical, the elimination
of wastes of time, labor and tne lack of efficiency, the careful purchasing
of goods, the taking cognizance of the business cycle and how it may affect

a given industry, the use of available material on the interpretation and
forecasting of "business conditions and the cycle, the closer coordination
between the different departments and between different industries in the
same class, the coordination of the production and distribution fields, so
that production will not run too far ahead of consumption, the effective use
of advertising to aid consumption, the regulation of time by the elimina-
tion of overtime work, the training of men to do more than one task, and
possibly many others.
(3) Oil THE PABT OP TH3 SOVSRIIMiitfJT.
The government should assume the direct initiative of means to stabilize
the industrial working week because it alone "sits in the driver* s seat."
Industry as a whole lacks a guiding leadership and many of the most effect-
ive means for the stabilization of the industrial working week demand that
all industry participate, otherwise the stabilization would not be effective
in the way that it should. This leadership should be, yes, must be, assumed
by government or else the effective stabilization of the industrial working
week will be a long way off.
Means by which the government may aid are: the limiting of the hours
of labor in the working week of industry, the reinauguration of employment
exchanges, the modification of the anti-trust laws, the relief in case of un-
employment, the elimination of child labor and some married women from in-
dustry, the reviewing of the debt question with the idea of cancelling or
reducing them, as an aid to world conditions which seriously involve our
participation in world trade, the entering into of international agreements
as a further aid to our world trade, the possible price stabilization, the
acceptance of one or .aore of the many plans submitted for governmental

participation in the problem, the continued rigid immigration laws, the
provision for the return of many foreigners not entitled to citizenship,
the improvement of living conditions, the aiding of weakened industries by
reduction of taxes, and possibly many others*
The carrying out of the governmental participation should not be in
the hands of Congress but in a board or commission which should have much
freedom in their economic planning.
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II
THE stabilization op the industrial working week mould be a beneficial
AND PRACTICABLE METHOD OF DEALING WITH ]MPLOYMENT.
Various plans have been proposed for the solution of the problem of
unemployment. Some of these have drawbacks. Unemployment insur«nce, whether
inaugurated by the Federal government, the State governments, or by the
individual business concern, is largely a relief measure. The practical
plan should tend to eliminate the problem at its source, r°ther th«»n w«it
until it nrrives, and then aid it. Our Socialistic friends tell us th»t
the only w«y to solve the problem of unemployment is by the creation of
a "3oci»listic State." Our country in the past has not been eager to follow
the footsteps of the socialistic groups, as is partially evidenced by the pres-
idential elections of the past twenty years. Nevertheless, our industries
are better off because of the "social controls." The plan of the stabiliza-
tion of the industrial working week is a practical one, for it has been tried
by industry and has been found to work, more or less satisfactorily. It is
practical and from the experience of those firms which have tried it, it
would be highly beneficial to industry in general.
Some of the plans propounded are similar to the story told about «
conference of mice on plans for foiling their enemy, the cat. A young
mouse spoke up:
"We will hang a bell on the cat's neck. Then, when she is near, the
bell will warn us."
The ide* was applauded warmly until a wise mouse asked:
"Who will tie the bell on the cat's neck?"
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(A)
IT WILL PREVENT UNEMPLOYMENT TO AN APPRECIABLE DEGREE.
The stabilization of the industrial working week would prevent unem-
ployment to an appreciable degree, because stabilization involves »n active
control of production based upon consumption. If the amount of the pro-
duction is known, and known in advance, a business man would be able to
g»uge his work and the work of his employees so that it would be easily
known how many men would be reouired to do the work in the given length
of time. It would be unnecessary to change the number of employees in a
plant unless emergencies arose, and those who were employed would be steadily
employed. Unemployment would be unknown in that particular plant. If the
situation were multiplied by many plants and industries, general unemploy-
ment would be prevented to an appreciable degree.
(1) EMPLOYEES WILL 3E ABLE TO PREVENT UNEMPLOYMENT W THEIR
OWN ESTABLISHMENTS OR GREATLY REDUCE THOSE THAT CAN NOT BE
ENTIRELY AVOIDED.
The stabilization of the industrial working week should be « problem
of the individual industrial plant. It is achieved by many means adaptable
to individual industries, as has been noted in a previous part of this
paper. Employers have little choice as to what plans shall be tried in
other industries, and the problem of unemployment, as far as they are greatly
concerned, is that with which they come in immediate contact. Stabilization
plans properly worked out upon a scientific basis will certainly curtail un-
employment to an appreciable degree.
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The business cycle may "be foretold to an every increasing degree of
accuracy, by those who are trained to read and use properly the various indices,
etc. With this information, available to any business man, proper measures
may be mde to safeguard the stability of the individual concern.
The setting up of reserves for contingencies is a well established
accounting procedure. At times of depression, demands are made upon a busi-
ness which are not made at other times. To meet these demands it is not be-
yond business to plan so that business may go along with less "dips," so that
the effect of the depressions may be minimized.
Seasonal fluctuations are readily discernible by those who keep
adequate records. Where style plays an important factor in seasonality
it m«y be difficult always to plan properly for thefuture, yet much has
been done along this line. Tea, the stabilization of the industrial
working week, with all that it implies would enable a business concern
to go through seasonal fluctuations and cyclical depressions with less
curt«ilment.

(B)
IT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO BUS IESSS
(1) IT WOULD REGULARISE GENERAL BUSINESS CONDITIONS
jitodern business is very closely inter-related and when the industrial
working week is successfully stabilized in one establishment it tends to
stabilize others as well. It would have a cumulative affect on general
business conditions, with the result that general business conditi ons
should retain » regular procedure without 3harp drops or rises.
(a) it would free purchasing power.
lien a worker feels insecure in his employment his attitude toward
spending money is likely to be one of great caution for he does not know
how long his job will last and how soon it will be necessary for him to
use what savings he has been able to accumulate. With a secure job the
worker will spend. A worker with steady employment usually has little
trouble in obtaining credit. He would pl«n over « yearly period rather
than a daily or weekly period. It has been estimated that about Q7% of the
purchases of the daily commodities of life are made by working men »nd
their families.
,<ith this freeing of purchasing power, expenditures would be uniform
over a period of time, which would maint»in a steady production and not
only be beneficial to one industry but would permeate throughout the busi-
ness life of the community and country.
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(2) IT WOULD INCREASE RETURNS
He who invests money in a business is much interested in the
returns which he will receive. The st«biliz»tion of the industrial working
week will tend to bring about an even flow of business and therefore re-
intermittent
turns And profits, Where the work in a plant is, more or less^, there is
bound to be losses, bec°use of the constant overhead and other cases. These
losses, being partly or entirely eliminated, would make the profits larger, and
the return on investment greater.
(«) IT WOULD INCREASE DE;£AND FOR GOODS.
The demand for goods would tend to increase, for unemployment with
its decrease of income, does not permit the workers to spend with the
frequency that they formerly did. With the security which accompanies the
stabilization of the working week, the worker* s purchases of commodities
will increase, for his standard of living will tend to rise as he is insured
of continuous employment. As the demand for goods will be increased on the
part of the workers, it will result in greater production on the part of
business and therefore, increase its returns.
(3) IT WOULD INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF MSN.
In work which renuires a high degree of skill, constant application to
the work must be maintained in order to keep at * high rate of efficiency.
With unstable employment we find together with the loss of skill, that produc-
tion is most likely to be sub-normal. After a worker has been employed for «
period of time efficiency is at a high point and production is at « maxi-
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mum. Y/hen the alack season approaches, efficiency is lost because of
fear of unemployment, by social pressure, etc. Not only does unemploy-
ment affect the individual worker hut also the whole group in the plant.
(a) M0HALS AND CONFIDENCE WOULD 3E wLAINT.'S NED.
A man who feels insecure in his work is likely to find his spirit
broken. As a dog, whose spirit is broken, has greatly lost his value, so
likewise a man, whose spirit is affected, will become less valuable to
himself, to his employer, and to his community. A workman who is secure in
his employment does not have the fears and worries that an unemployed man
has and his confidence and morale are not so easily shaken. Thus he becomes
a better workman and he becomes of more benefit to business,
(4) IT WOULD ELLflNATE THE VJETE OF BREAKING IN
NEW LIEN.
Any plan, in business, which would keep down expenses is worth an
investigation. Every time a new man is employed in a business it takes
considerable time and money to fit him into the organization. Especially
true, is it, if the work requires a high degree of skill or special know-
ledge. With the stabilization of the industrial working week, employ-
ment would be continuous and the need of breaking in new men would be
gone, except on rare occasions, and so a saving would be made.
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(O
IT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL SOCIALLY.
(1) IT WOULD MINIMIZE THE BURDEN CARRIED BY ,ELFARE AGENCIES.
If the industrial working week were st«bilized, men would be
permanent ly employed and we would not have the drain on welf«re agencies
which we now have. Maiiy cities and towns in the country have various kinds
of welfare agencies. Some of these are carried on by the cities and towns
while others are supported from private sources. During the past few years
excessive dr»ins have been placed upon these agencies, extr« auotas have
been levied, but if we had stabilization commonly practiced, this dr»in on
the employed, to aid the unemployed or the dr«in on the t»x appropriations,
would be eliminated.
(2) IT WOULD LESSEN INDUSTRIAL UNREST.
A worker who is steadily employed is a happy worker. A happy worker
is not one who is anxious to cause trouole with his lot.
Henry S. Dennison, the president of the Dennison Manufacturing Com-
pany, is quoted as saying that worker's fears are not to be easily con-
quered. They are nourished by a man's own experience and those he hears
about. One of our new employees, for example, let drop a suggestion a few
years ago, in the stress of controversy, that he thought a certain method
could be improved. Our factory manager asked him if he had made the suggestion
to his foreman. "Nothing doing," he said, "It 1 8 only three months ago that I
was fired from the "X" mill for just that, and I am not risking it again so
soon. " They are well-grounded fears not to be uprooted without deep plowing.*
* Stanley B. Mathewson. "Restriction of Output Among Unorganized Workers."
p. 185.
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Industrial unrest is caused, in part, by grievances, real or imagined.
A worker, whose work is stabilized, is not likely to have grievances of a
serious nature. If the individual worker is satisfied with his conditions
there is little cause for organizations of workers, whether unionized or
not, to cause trouble or unrest.
(D)
IT WOULD BE PRACTICABLE.
(1) RESEARCH, WIDESPREAD EDUCATION AND COOPERATIVE EFFORT
WOULD TEND TO MAKE IT MORE EFFECTIVE.
From the evidence of those companies that have tried various methods
of stabilizing the industrial working week, it proves that it is advisable
in industry as a whole. Not all methods work equally well, neither is it
safe to say whic* method is the most applicable to any given industry.
Enougn data is being kept so that more scientific approaches may be safely
made in the future*
The average business executive is rather slow in trying new methods
but with the information now available and the opportunity for associa-
tions of various kinds to further the industry in which he may be in, or
by legal compulsion, the working week could be stabilized to a substantial
degree*
A helpful activity of the government would be to keep the subject
of stabilization before the public. The inertia which keeps industrial
firms and labor leaders thinking along the old grooves must be undermined
by studies which bring forcefully to public attention the possibilities of
regular izat ion*

Trade associations have been active in the "helps" which they have
been able to give to the participants of the associations. It is possible,
by the uniting of different groups, to make stabilization methods more
effective. Associations of various kinds are always seeking the best way
to do things and if stabilization were required of industry, the associa-
tions could be made to be of great aid in its success.
The fortunate aspect of stabilization, unlike medical treatment,
is that industrial good health is contagious. So great is the inter-
dependence of business enterprises that every little improvement in
regularity of operation made in one concern or locality sends out ripples
that help to steady the rest of industry. When enough effort has been
exerted in every quarter, the cumulative effect will be substantial, and
security of employment will become a more normal characteristic of in-
dustrial life. In the meanwhile, every attempt at regular iz at ion supplies
evidence and practice toward a progressively more stable industrial life*
Every success achieved or improvement made gains momentum for the creative
point of view upon which a solution of the problem depends,
(2) WORJCINGMEN'S COMPENSATION WAS MADE EFFECTIVE
THROUGH PENALIZING NEGLIGENT EMPLOYERS
.
In 1911, the industrial States, including Massachusetts, began to pass
workmen's compensation laws requiring employers to provide for the payment
of half to two thirds of normal wages for a specified number of weeks as
accident benefits to injured employees. These laws compelled employers
to take out compensation insurance policies as a guaranty that their
employees would receive benefits if injured in connection with their work.
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The insurance requirements called for higher insurance premiums
from companies with high accident frequency than from companies in which
fewer accidents occurred. It thus cost money to have accidents and money
could he saved hy avoiding them. Not long afterward the safety first
movement was sweeping the country.*
When employers found that they could save money by preventing accidents,
they prevented them. There is reason to believe that any plan whereby the
employer paid for preventable lay-offs, would incite him to do his utmost
to reduce the number of lay-offs and so reduce the number of unemployed,
just as compulsory compensation insurance under workmen's compensation acts
led him to reduce the number of industrial accidents*
As the workingmen's compensation was made more effective through the
aid of the government certainly a penalty of some sort could be placed upon
those delinquent or unwilling employers who did not see fit to aid, in the
welfare of the country, by following stabilization methods in an effective
way.
* "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on Un-
employment." p. 119.

(E)
THE NEGLECT TO ORGANIZE INDUSTRY" FOR STABILIZATION CAN NOT
ENTIRELY BE MADE UP FOR BY THE GOVERNMENT OR THE COMMUNITY.
As I see it, the main responsibility for the stabilizing of the indus-
trial working week should come from industry itself. Governments have from
time to time attempted to enter the industrial activities of the various
countries, but the results have not always been satisfactory. Final judge-
ment of the Russian experiment will have to wait, as the information avail-
able from Russia is not truely reliable and conflicting reports are the
result*
In New Zealand, control of private industry, in order to hold within
proper bounds with respect to price, has been attemptea by government com-
petition with private industry, especially in mining. In New Zealand also,
the government has owned and operated the railroads and has been very
active in business of all kinds. It was thought that at one time that New
Zealand was almost an earthly paradise. ... Alas, soon afterwards there
were the most violent strikes in New Zealand, in spite of the efforts of
the government to regulate the relations between employer and employee.
Now New Zealand is in deep distress and can hardly be held up as a model.*
(1) NO METHOD OF PROVIDING MAINTENANCE WITHOUT WORK
IS SATISFACTORY.
The supporting of men, who are out of work, by industry or by a tax
would be inadvisable.
Our dole system - a levy on the still employed to support the unem-
ployed - has its disadvantages also. It has been said that the money
beittk; spent for relief of the unemployed amounts to #100,000,000. a year,
* "Planning for Economic Stability." p. 117.

most of which comes out of municipal and county taxes rather than the
Federal Treasury.*
Our methods of haphazard private charity cost additional millions
and is uncertain to the recipient, while the dole has the one advantage
of being certain so the recipient can go ahead and buy the necessities
of life, a policy which keeps the money in circulation.
(a) UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IS NOT SATISFACTORY.
A favorite answer to the problem of unemployment appears to be
unemployment insurance. It is not the purpose of this paper to go into
the details of the unemployment insurance schemes. It is safe to say-
that the various unemployment schemes do not provide adequate relief,
but a small sum, which hardly appears able to supply the bare necessities
for a working man and his family.
It is true that some unemployment insurance schemes do tend to sta-
bilise the working week* The stabilization effect of the unemployment in-
surance funds on the "cap industry" has been very important. In slack sea-
sons it is easy for an individual to set up a small "back-store shop, n work
eighteen hours a day under sweat-shop conditions and sell uis product at
very low prices, thus undermining the standards set by responsible employ-
ers. Unemployment insurance gives members resistance against this abuse.
It is a stabilizing influence, rather than a welfare measure that the plan
has the greatest value for the organization. It has been of inestimable
benefit to the stabilization of the industry.
f
The Massachusetts Emergency Commission on Unemployment has made a
careful study of various aspects of unemployment. As a result of their
activities, the Commission proposes an act to provide for the setting
* Roy Dickinson. "Wages and Wealth." p. 102.
# "Union Provide Against Unemployment." pp. 17, 8
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up of Compulsory Unemployment Reserves. The report states thatj
"We recommend the establishment of compulsory unemployment reserves
to which employers of ten or more persons, except in agriculture and
certain employments, shall be required to contribute 2% of the pay roll
of all employees except those who received more than #1,500 during
twelve months period of unemployment. The employer's payment is to be
made monthly or oftener to an unemployment reserve fund deposited with
the Treasurer of the Commonwealth for account of the employer and his
employees, each employer's deposits to be kept in a separate account.
The employer may substitute his own voluntary plan, providing the
benefits offered are at least equivalent to those required by the bill,
subject to approval of the Department of Labor and Industries."*
Under the proposed plan, benefits from each employer's account are
to be paid eligible employees laid off more than four weeks or dismissed
for no fault of the employee, providing the employee is unable to find
suitable employment by the end of four weeks. The amount of the benefits
is to be one half the normal wage or salary of the employee, but not to
exceed $10 a week. Benefits are to be paid for not more than ten weeks
in any twelve months. ...
When the employer's unemployment reserve account amounts to $50 per
covered employee, he is required to contribute 1% of his pay roll, as long
as the account remains at or above this level. When the account reaches
$75 per employee, no further contributions are to be required so long as
his account does not fall below that level.
f
As is seen, the amount received by any one worker over a period
of sustained unemployment would not be very large. The large cost of un-
* "Report ot the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on
Unemployment." p. 23.
# Ibid. p. 24.
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employment is therefore to be taken care of by the disposed worker. The
"apparent" heavy cost of this scheme on the part of the employer is in
fact a small one when compared to the load which the unemployed worker
must provide for in cases of prolonged unemployment.
An equally important factor may be the probable effect upon the em-
ployer to reduce as much as possible the number of lay-offs and dismis-
sals in order to keep his unemployment reserve at the $50 or the $75
level and thus reduce the amount vtiiich he would be required to pay into
the fund. It is possible, by careful management, to reduce labor turnover
materially.
Unemployment reserve funds may be set up in one of three ways, - with
payments by the employees, with payments by the employers or with both
maicing contributions.
Much has been said as to the best method to follow but as yet there
is no uninamity of opinion. The Massachusetts Emergency Commission report
holds that:
"The pros and cons of these three may be argued from an ethical basis
or a practical. On the former, - that is, on grounds of fairness there
could probably be little question that a*iy plan of unemployment reserves
which undertook complete relief of employees should be contributory. But
the bill here presented goes a very short distance toward complete relief,
so that arguments which refer consciously or unconsciously to schemes
which would pay benefits sufficient for full support, do not concern us
there. "*
Unemployment reserves are not a new venture in the United States. In
1929, for example, there were thousands of workers in manufacturing plants
• "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on Un-
employment." p. 25,
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in the United States whose jobs and incomes were more secure against
threats of unemployment than those of their fellows. They were employed
by companies which stood ready to pay them at least a part of their wages
for a minimum of several weeks, or a lump sum in lieu of wages, if they
were laid off through no fault of their own.
The setting up of reserves for future contingencies is a long-
established practice in American business. Many businesses today set aside
money regularly to pay taxes, and also maintain a depreciation reserve; that
is, it saves a part of its earnings upon which it can draw to replace build-
ings, machinery and other equipment. Some businesses set aside dividend
reserves, saving part of the earnings of good years so as to continue dividends
when earnings are small. The object is to stabilize business dividend pay-
ments*
A question which may very well be asked is whether unemployment re-
serve plans will aid unemployment or will aid in the solution of the problem
in any material way. The Massachusetts Commission feels that:
"Unemployment Reserves prevent unemployment in both good and bad years.
Unemployment in ordinary years is caused by seasonal variations in business
and by a long list of economic changes, including changes in industry,
not merely the invention of new machinery, but other changes in tech-
nique as well as changes in product, in management, in location, in labor
supply. As much as 6/o to 10$ of the normal working force of the nation
is out of work on any ordinary working day in a normally good year.*
* Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on
Unemployment. M p. 117.
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It is not easy to reduce the amount of unemployment at all times
by these causes. But employers can do a good deal to regularize employ-
ment through the seasons and to cushion the effects of change as they
occur. A few have proved this by doing it. Unemployment reserves provide
a direct incentive to the employer to keep his employees at work as steadi-
ly and for as long periods as possible, to select new employees more care-
fully, so that they will be worth keeping as long as possible, and to avoid
unnecessary temporary lay-off, as well as permanent dismissal, by every
means possible* This is perhaps the most valuable feature of this type of
unemployment effort*
The employer who pays a percentage of his pay roll into an unemploy-
ment reserve under such a plan as provided by this Commission is in the
position of the boy trying to fill a leaky pail with water* The more he
can diminish the size of the leak, the sooner he can fill the pail.
The Massachusetts proposal does not provide for an adequate solution
to the prolonged unemployment problem. Failure to provide for protracted
unemployment is an admitted weakness of this proposal, but it shares this
weakness with every other type of self-supporting unemployment relief meas-
ures. Even the supposedly liberal European plans provide insurance benefits
for only a limited period, long protracted unemployment being relieved from
other funds*
To show what the effect of such a plan as suggested would be, the
report of the Commission gives the following:
If all manufacturers in Massachusetts had been required in the five
or six years prior to 1930 to build up unemployment reserves, and if all
had been successful in building their reserves up to the maximum of $75
per employee there would have been available in this State, when the
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depression began, about $42,000,000 from which to pay benefits to workers
laid off. If the reserves had reached an average of only $50 per em-
ployee the amount would have been #28,000,000.
To accumulate the $42,000,000 or the #28,000,000 in manufacture over
a period of five or six years would have cost no more than an average of
eleven-hundredths of a cent to seven-tenths of a cent per dollar of factory
sales price, depending upon the industry.*
Such a fund, as proposed, may be invested in many ways, none of
which appear to be satisfactory, as is evidenced from a further study of the
plan.
"When money is paid into a reserve fund, the fund itself is spent
in some fashion. The reserve funds are set up by business houses, whether
for unemployment reserves or for any other purposes, are not allowed to
lie idle. There is in fact no way to keep them idle unless they are kept
locked up in the company *s safe or buried in the ground. They are put
to work. They may be deposited in the bank and left there to be drawn
upon as needed. They may be invested in comparatively safe and easily
marketable securities. They may be put into short term investments, such
as good commercial paper, acceptances and call loans. They may be "left
in the business" to be used by the employer as he used other available
funds. In any case, the funds are put to some use in which they repre-
sent an addition to the supply of investable capital, and the accumula-
tion of investable funds of this nature during the upswing of the busi-
ness cycle produces an effect upon the cycle which may work against
stabilization.
* "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on
Unemployment." p. 127

"If the reserve funds are deposited in the bank they are used by
the bank as the basis for loans, principally to other business men for a
variety of business purposes, or to home builders to further the erection
of dwelling houses. In any case, they are not locked up out of use, but
appear on the market in the form of a purchasing power in the hands of
those who have borrowed them. They thus increase the demand for what-
ever sorts of goods these persons buy.
"Moreover, each dollar in the bank increases the potential demand for
these goods by about ten times its own face value, because, in ordinary
times banks lend about ten times as much in the form of credit as they
have actual cash on hand. The increase in purchasing power resulting
from the deposit of reserve funds in banks is thus considerably greater
than the amount deposited. ..• It becomes apparent, therefore, that the
building up of a reserve fund does not decrease the amount of purchasing
power appearing on the market during the upswing in business* It does
transfer it in part from consumer goods to capital goods, - raw materials,
machinery, new buildings, etc. The demand for consumer goods is decreased
more than proportionately.
"This is the wrong thing to encourage, inasmuch as the overproduction
of capital goods needs to be prevented in order to minimize the extent
of booms.
"If the reserve funds are invested in securities - government bonds
and gilt-edged securities of business corporations - they are put to
work. Companies that keep fairly liquid funds in this form buy seasonal
securities in the market just as other investors do. This means that
payments made by the employing company into its reserve fund are, in effect,
paid to investors for the purchase of securities they are willing to sell
instead of to the company*s own stockholders in the form <cf dividends.
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"The result is the transfer of purchasing power from one group to
another. Investors have the money to spend instead of stockholders. If
there is any differences to which the money is put as a result of this
transfer, it is that the sellers of the bonds and stocks may reinvest a
little more of the money in other securities than the company's own stock-
holders would have done. ... This difference, if it exists, would operate
in the wrong direction from the point of view of industrial stabilization.
"If the reserve funds are to be kept in the business they are likely
to become in fact merely a bookkeeping item. In such a case, the account-
ing department will enter among the company's liabilities an item, "Unem-
ployment Reserve," and the amount included in it will appear under this
head instead of in "Surplus or Undivided Profits."
"No separate fund will be kept, and benefits will in fact be paid out
of current income.
"This arrangement is not in reality the type of unemployment reserve
plan contemplated in our recommendations. We wish to stress the importance
of accumulating a reserve fund, both to safeguard the payment of benefits
and to make the incentive to regularize employment as strong as possible*
V/e believe, further, that the employer's reserve fund, while kept as a
separate account for the benefits of his employees, should not be invested
by him because of the financial problems just discussed, which can be
solved more readily by centralized control. Neither should the disposi-
tion of it be subject to his control.*
If not properly financed, payments of benefits during depression
might make depression worse.
"The unfavorable effect of reserve funds upon cyclical fluctuations
in business, is accentuated by the large drains upon them from benefit
* "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on
Unemployment." pp. 134, 136.
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payments*
HIf the funds have been deposited in the banks, sudden rise in the
demand for cash with which to pay benefits may come at a time when the
banks are unable to stand unusual strain.
"In the past, banks have been weakened, often for months, after a
sharp decline in business* At the critical period, when the turn in busi-
ness from "good times" to depression has become evident, heavy demands
for cash have been made upon banks, seriously depleting their cash re-
serves. At such times the credit structure has tottered. This has usually
passed, demand liabilities have declined, reserves have been built up again,
and the phenomenon of idle credit has appeared* •••
"If the funds have been invested in securities and short term paper,
the effort to turn them into cash will accelerate the decline of security
prices and impair the market for commercial paper, making less effective
the efforts to check depression.
"If the funds have been used in business and are wanted in large
amounts during a depression, the financial standing of the company may be
threatened. Only current assets can be utilized. They are under heavy
strain during depression. It is probable that only a company that keeps
its current position stronger by the amount of its unemployment reserve
can enter a depression period and continue to pay benefits without
depreciating its credit standing and impairing its ability to maintain
employment during depression.*
"Employers shall make their unemployment reserve contributions into
a fund administered as to detail by the Department of Labor and Industries,
and invested by the iitate Treasurer, each employer's account with the fund
* "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on Un-
employment." pp. 136, 7.
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being kept separate, the total fund being kept as a special account on the
Treasurer's books. Investment of this fund shall be limited so far as pos-
sible to treasury certificates of the United States Government until such
time as suitable arrangements can be made for deposit of state funds in the
Federal Reserve 3ank of Boston.
"We recommend investment in treasury certificates because investi-
gations conducted by the Commission's staff indicate that this form of
investment will provide the necessary safety and liquidity and will minimize
adverse cyclical effects. We find only one objection of any importance to
limiting the investment of these funds in this manner; treasury certificates
pay ordinarily a very low rate of interest, and the income of the fund would
be reduced by this limitation. We believe, however, that as long as the
fund earns enough to pay administrative costs of the unemployment reserve
system, the probable effect of its presence on the capital market is of more
consequence than additions to the fund in the form of larger income. "#
Twenty countries, or more, have made attempts at the ideal form of un-
employment insurance. In the "Ghent Plan" the city contributes equally with
the employees. The employers do not make any payments. The plan was put
into force in 1901. The plan was difficult to supervise and did not prove it-
self satisfactory.
In Great Britain, a plan was set in motion in 1911 and worked well
until 1914, when the war made it unnecessary. From 1920 until 1930 the
plan did not work at all well; the expenditures were very heavy. The plan,
the details of which I shall not go into, has been changed more or less
frequently since 1920.
# "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on Un-
employment." p. 141.

Great 3ritain has courageously experimented in this field to her
advantage and to the profit of other nations. In whatever way she may re-
organize her attact on unemployment, her experience with unemployment in-
surance suggests a number of considerations which may well he taken into
account in the present discussions of unemployment in the United States.
These considerations, briefly summarized, are as follows;
1. Unemployment is largely due to poor adjustment of industry to
changing conditions in internal and international trade. Unemployment
insurance should therefore be so organized as to tend to make all parties
in industry sensitive to shifts in consumer demand, the introduction of
new industrial processes and the general rapid rate of change in industry
and trade*
2. In planning a scheme of unemployment insurance consideration should
be given to it3 ultimate coordination with a 3ystera of old-age pensions.
... An unemployment insurance scheme with a dismissal feature would be
a protection against the risk and in many cases would suffice to tide the
worker over until the age of eligibility for a retirement allowance if a
pension plan were in operation.
3. A brief record of unemployment experience may make possible
fairly accurate calculation of the cost of seasonal or even cyclical un-
employment but not of the emergency situations involved in the long-time
employment trend.
4. A plan of unemployment insurance should be constructed strictly
on insurance lines and no departure from this principle should be permitted
in any subsequent revision of the plan.
5. In constructing a plan, decision must be made as to whether the
scale of benefits shall be designed to protect the workers' standard of
living or merely to provide subsistence minimum.
Great Britain chose the
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latter procedures leaving to private industry and trade unions the task of
providing payments additional to the State benefits which were scaled to
the wage of the unskilled laborer.
6. The numerous changes in the British law since the war have been
dictated by immediate needs or political expediency. Theory and principle
have been largely disregarded.
7. Unemployment insurance should not be financed by a tax on employ-
ment that compels industries and firms with low unemployment rates to share
unreasonably the unemployment costs of others with highly irregular em-
ployment. It would seem that in the United States consideration should
be given to a scheme of insurance by industry that would contribute to
industrial planning, with rebates to firms attaining relatively low unem-
ployment rates as an incentive to plant planning for regularization of
employment • ...
8. The administration of a State scheme of unemployment insurance
is impracticable without a system of unemployment exchanges*
9. The operation of employment exchanges and unemployment insurance
in Great Britain has yielded valuable statistical data, but the scheme has
not afforded the information necessary to place it on an actuarial basis.
10. Once an unemployment insurance scheme is adopted it should not
be permitted to become the only or even the major reliance in the struggle
against unemployment. There must be a frame work of prevention that in-
fluences management in individual establishments and entire industries
and that also affects governmental policy.
Unforeseen developments in Great Britain thus upset all actuarial
calculations and the same thing would happen in any industrial nation. . .•

11. The total cost of the British unemployment insurance experiment
from January 1919 to the end of November 1930 amounted to approximately
$2,400,000,000. An additional sura of §1,500,000,000 was spent for out-of-
work donations to demobilized soldiers, and in various forms of relief.*
In Germany, a plan went into motion in 1927 and is of the contributory
type. The employers and the employees each put into the fund six and one
half per cent of the wages of the employees. The cost of administration
is paid by the government. Unlike the plans of other countries the out-
of-work "employee" receives inversely with the w^ge scale*
The unemployment plans of the nations cover approximately 35,000,000
workers.
(2) CHARITY OR DOLE IS DEMORALIZING AND DEPRESSING,
A person, who because he has lost his job, and is unable to take care
of himself or his family and receives aid from the city, welfare associa-
tions or other charitable organizations, is not in a position to "hold his
head up" in the community. If he is an upstanding citizen his self-respect
is impaired, in spite of the cause of his lack of employment. His faith
in his country and humanity in general, is likely to be shattered. His
ideals of life must be lowered, at least temporarily, because of his finan-
cial circumstances. All in all, v/hen a person receives charity, if he is
the type that amounts to much in this world, it is likely to create a
demoralizing and depressing influence.
* Roy Dickinson. "Stages and Wealth." pp. 101-102.

If)
A PUBLIC WORK RESERVE PLAN WOULD 3E INADEQUATE.
The advocation of public works during a period of depression is a
common remedy suggested by many. Only recently, President-elect Franklin
D. Roosevelt has advocated a huge plan of public works, as an aid to the
solution of the present difficulties. By this plan it is estimated that
200,000 men will be directly employed. It is quite impossible to estimate
the number of men who would be put to work, as the result of these opera-
tions, in those industries which supply materials for the public works*
Attempts have been made by governments to plan ahead for public work
operations to be put into effect at opportune times.
A definite start was made in lone ranged planning of public works by
the Government of the United States in the passage of the Wagner bill in
February, 1931. (Senate bill 5776)
This bill, though providing for a small reserve, is a new departure
in governmental procedure. It creates a Federal Employment Stabilization
Board consisting of four Cabinet officers - the Secretaries of the Treasury,
of Commerce, of Labor and of Agriculture,
"It shall be the duty of the Board to advise the president from time
to time of the trend of employment and business activity and of the exist-
ence or approach of periods of business depression and unemployment in the
United States or in any substantial part thereof. ... Whenever, on the re-
commendation of the Board, the president finds that there exists, or
within six months next following there is likely to exist, a period of
business depression or unemployment, he is requested to submit to the
Congress by special message, at such ti ae and from time to time thereafter,

such supplementary estimates as he deems advisable for emergency ap-
propriations, to be expended during such period upon public works in the
United States or in the area affected, in order to prevent unemployment
and permit the government to avail itself of the opportunity for speedy,
efficient and economical construction during any such period."
The public works emergency appropriations, not to exceed #150,000,000
in any one year, are not, however to be expended for any program the
President might choose, but are specifically confined to highway, river
and harbor, flood control and public building projects.
The bill directs every department engaged in construction work to
prepare and always keep in readiness construction plans. The director of
the budget is required to consolidate these scores of plans, after making
such changes and recommendations as a responsible financial officer com-
monly makes covering six years in the future.
As Federal construction constitutes but about ten per cent, of the
total public construction in the United States, the Wagner \ct merely
touches the fringe of the problem. The future problem is that of strength-
ening the Wagner Act, of creating a reserve which would really affect the
situation in times of approaching depression, and of carrying the same
principle into effect in the cities and states.*
Such plans are sorely needed. It is estimated from 1923 to 1929
that the Federal government and all local governments in the United States
spent together as much as ^20,000,000,000 for public works, road building,
etc. In other words in a period of unworried prosperity and better than
normal employment, the American governments, far fror.i setting aside reserves
for the future, went on with great expenditures for these "improvements."
* Harry W. Laidler. "Unemployment and Its Remedies." pp. 38, 39.
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toith the onset of the depression, there were no adequate public reserves
but our governments were burdened with peak debts and peak taxations.*
If it were possible for a smaller percentage of public works projects
to be undertaken in periods when private industry is active, so that more
work might be done during periods when private industry is slack, the Gov-
ernment might not compete with private industry to so great an extent in
times of prosperity and thus would not be a factor in the inflation of
money rates, prices of materials and employment.
The accumulation of a reserve of public works and purchases by the
government would mitigate the severity of a year of depression, but from
a practical standpoint the aggregate is not likely to be large enough to
make a fundamental difference in the measure which will enforce a degree
of long range planning upon business as a whole* Until recently the
opinion seems to have been that the business cycle was practically unalter-
able and that planning of public works was about the only measure that would
make cyclical unemployment less severe. The newer attitude is decidedly that
cycles need not to be so severe in the future as they have been in the past,
and that economic measures can be devised which will bring them under a con-
siderable degree of control. This i3 a most significant advance in our think-
ing concerning prevention of cyclical unemployment.
The extent to which depression construction provides employment has
been widely and heatedly debated. It is frequently reported that few men
are employed on public works projects, highway building particularly,
because of the extensive use of machinery. It is also objected that public
works cannot provide employment economically for men unfamiliar with the
work*
* Leo Wolman. "Tale Review." Winter 1933. pp. 29, 4*
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The amount of employment provided "by money spent on public works is
indicated by several recent investigations. In February, 1932, the United
States Bureau of Public Roads announced the results of an analysis of labor
cost of concrete highways financed in part by Federal aid. These highways
were not built by hand labor methods, but the prevailing methods of con-
struction. About 15 per cent, of the cost of concrete pavements were shown
to have been paid to men employed directly on the construction job.*
Ultimately, at least 85 per cent, was paid out in wages and salaries,
considering the services to persons engaged in producing materials, supplies,
fuel and transportat ion.
#
The additional employment created outside the immediate labor on road
construction would not be available at once, but would be spread over several
months. Some of it might not appear for a year or more*
Construction of public works is not a cure-all for unemployment*
Proper planning and administration of public works, directed intentionally
at the goal of stabilization, will make possible, however, reduction in
the number of unemployed by thousands in the periods of depression and it
will save the government money in the process.
(1) IT IS AN EMERGENCY MEASURE SUITABLE FOR CRISES.
The amount of public works does not constitute a very large proportion
of the construction work of the country. The amount has been estimated to be
not more than ten per cent* This ten per cent, would be beneficial only when
the remaining ninety per cent has been seriously curtailed. Thus it is
seen that public works would be important only as an emergency measure.
* "Report of the Activities of the Massachusetts Emergency Commission on
Unemployment. M P« 167.
# Ioid. P. 167.
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(a) IT WOULD BENEFIT CYCLICAL
UNEMPLOYMENT ONLY.
Public works take a long time for completion and therefore would
not be an aid to casual, seasonal or technological unemployment. There
remains only the cyclical unemployment, which exerts itself at the time of
the depressions*
(2) THERE ARE MAN? OBJECTIONS TO IT,
(a) IT IS UNCERTAIN HQ! MUCH PUBLIC WORKS CAN BE DEFERRED UNTIL
PERIODS OF DEPRESSION.
During periods of prosperity when business activities are at their
height, there is occasion for expansion and the usual course of business
has been to expand, as it is needed. The feelings which accompany business
activities of a prosperity-feeling also prevail in other lines of activity.
The demand for public works usually has exerted itself at this period. It
is difficult, therefore, to know just how much should be postponed until the
periods of depression. Many times public works have been put into practice
during periods of slackness when they were not needed and the opinion of
many was that they were a great "waste of money."
(b) IT WOULD BENEFIT CERTAIN GROUPS OR CLASSES.
Not all men are capable or able to perform the work necessary to be
done in the construction of public works. It therefore would aid certain
and not all classes of the unemployed*
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( c ) IT WOULD BE UHCSRTAU3 WHETHER IT WOULD GIVE RELIEF TO THE
RIGHT PARTS OF THE COUNTRY.
Public works, suitable to employ enough men to make a marked difference
on the unemployment situation must of necessity be on a large 3cale. Certain
parts of the country might benefit while other parts would be little helped.
Labor is quite immobile. Public works involve actions of legislatures, which
in turn involves politics. Politicians do not always choose the right thing
and public works may "be started for political advantages and one section of
the country suffer at the expense of another.

SUMMARY
The stabilization of the industrial working week is a worthy goal
for which to strive. There are, as I have pointed out, three different
groups which might solve the problem, the employers, the employees and
the governments. The employees, whether as individuals or organized, by
means of labor unions, or otherwise, seem unable to adequately cope with
the situation. It is not their problem, primarily, and consequently they
should not be held responsible for the solution of it. As far as the so-
lution being left to the government is concerned, we find the government is
constantly entering into the control of business. At the time of the emer-
gency created by the World War, the government showed its effectiveness in
the control of industry through the activities of the War Industries Board.
At the present time, we have a number of Boards and Commissions which are
active in the regulation and control of various activities of the nation.
The people of the United States are gradually being forced to accept the
various social controls of business regardless of their attitude toward the
socialistic state . The government must assume the initiative in requir-
ing industry to accept stabilization policies and methods because our in-
dustrial leaders are not prone to cooperate on a large scale unless forced
to do so. Upon the shoulders of the employers, considerable responsibility
rests, for theirs is the task of putting into actual use the various poli-
cies and methods of stabilization. From the experience of some who have tried
stabilization methods they are capable of doing much to stabilize the indus-
trial working week.
There are many means adaptable to the individual employer to make sta-
bility a definite and satisfactory solution to the problem of unemployment.

129
By scientific management, by the regulation of production, by proper planning
and forecasting, by coordinating the production with the sales department,
by economies of operation, etc., the working week could be stabilized in an
effective manner. From the evidence of attempts at stabilization of the work-
ing week, it may be seen that stabilization is not a myth but an actual reality.
If certain of our firms have tried stabilization methods and have had success
with them, there is no reason why more firms should not also attempt the same
thing, and be successful. This stabilization would be beneficial to business
generally and to people socially for unemployment would largely be elimi-
nated and its curses and distresses along with it.
There are many ways by which the government may aid in the solution of
this problem. Many plans have been suggested such as the Chase plan, the
Swope plan, the suggestion of some form of Economic Council by giving more
power to existing boards and commissions, by acts which will govern the
number of working hours for labor, by acts concerning the regulation of child
labor, by the proper regulation of tariffs, by the control of immigration,
etc*
Unemployment caused by cyclical depressions, is the most difficult to
handle, but great forward steps have been made in knowledge pertaining to
business cycles. If a "real" theory of the business cycle could be worked
out and generally accepted, more progress would be made. However, there is
enough material now available for the average employer to use to good ad-
vantage in his own establishment. As our forecasting of periods of the cycle
becomes more accurate, we shall be able to control the periods of the cycle
better, eo that we will not continue along the lines of our present "feasts
and famines." Lack of initiative is one reason why more employers do not
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try to use the information available on the business cycles. They may be
likened to that Ozark man who played his banjo and never mended his roof.
When it was raining, he could not and when it was shining, he did not need
the roof. When the depression comes it is too late to do anything about it
and when we are not in the period of depressional misery, we are too busy.
Unemployment insurance has not been considered at great length,
because experience shows that it is largely a relief measure and does not,
to any appreciable degree, aid employment. The amounts received from
unemployment benefits or insurance are so small, as a usual thing, that
they provide only for the purchase of the bare necessities of life.
Many foreign countries and many states of the United States either have or
are considering unemployment benefit or insurance proposals. As is pointed
out in the report of the Massachusetts * Emergency Commission on Unemploy-
ment there is no adequate way for the handling of the reserve funds of the
benefit schemes. This makes a weakness which is hard to surmount.
"Public works" is not an adequate aid to the problem of unemployment
or stabilization. The amount of money spent on public works is a small pro-
portion of the total spent on construction work and would be a temporary
measure, which would, in most cases, add to the burdens of the people at a
time when the taxes are already heavy.
I have attempted to show that the stabilization of the industrial work-
ing week is a most worthy cause, demanding from the part of the government
and industry itself, great responsibility for its achievement.
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